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A Survey of Public Utility Regulation
in the United States
The regulation of private industry, viewed from a histor­
ical background, has oscillated between two poles of social theoz 
ies, collectivism and individualism. Under systems of paternal­
ism, mercantilism and feudalism, individual initiative was great­
ly restricted for enterprise existed only through the consent of 
the State and in the interest of the State.
With the ushering in of a new economic theory which looked 
to competition as the mode of regulating industry, individual 
initiative came into its own, while governmental interference 
in business went by the boards. Under this theory of laissez- 
faire, competition was the life of trade, and public welfare c 
could best be served by free competition.
The origin of machine industry, bringing with it an era of 
free competition, changed the whole economic system. During this 
era of free competition enterprise developed rapidly and ’’the 
captain of industry, the substantial business man, was inducted 
into the seats of the mighty where he presently took precedence . 
of the Absentee Landlord and the Merchant Prince, who had recent­
ly been his oetters”.^*
The rise of absentee ownership and the informal method 
of management which characterized it led to a special class of
1. Veblen, Thorstein, Absentee Ownership Ch.4, B.W. Huebsch Inc.
1923.
2.
evils in those enterprises which were granting service to the pub­
lic, and as a result "the most rugged individuals of American
2
individualism",’the western farmers, initiated a storm of protest 
against unfair competition, rebating, discriminations, and exorb­
itant prices charged by the railroads.
This so-called Granger Reaction resulted in a wave of 
maximum rate regulation in Western States. In 1876 the Supreme 
Court of the United States upheld the constitutionality of the 
State of Illinois to prescribe a schedule of maximum rates for 
"a business affected with a public interest" in the decision of 
Munn vs Illinois. ' Thus the old concept that certain classes of 
industry are affected with a public interest and hence should be 
regulated was revivified. This event marks the beginning of Pub­
lic Utility Regulation in the United States.
A history of regulation must start with the transportation 
utilities for they were the pioneers, and consequently from the 
first came under the police power of the state. The turnpikes and 
canals fell under the control of the state, because the netion-^ 
was prevalent before 1830 that it was the duty of the state to 
provide for inland transportation. With the advent of the rail­
road the regulation of this form of common carrier was justified 
under the theory that a railroad was a public highway. wAs in 
1830 the Federal Government stepped aside for state governments, 
so in 1850 state governments assigned to corporations the duty
- • ■ ■■ ■■
2. See Beard, Charles A, The Myth of Rugged American Individual­
ism, Harper’s Dec. 1931 1 s i
3. 94 U.S. 113 ? f‘ ‘ ‘
4
3,
of furnishing inland transportation"
The new order that originated, with the machine industry 
saw the development of the corporate form of business organizat­
ion from the rather unwieldy partnership form of organization. 
So with the decline of the theory that it was the duty of the 
state to provide for inland transportation we find the ^tate del­
egating this duty to private enterprise through the corporate 
franchise. The states for the most part were very liberal in 
granting franchises, for the demand was usually for more railroads 
to beget competition.
Regulation by the Charter
"A franchise is any special right or privelege conferred
5.by legislative power on corporations or persons." Franchises 
are of two types, (1) general, (2) special. The general franchise 
is simply the franchise to be a corporation. "The charter of a 
corporation is the law which gives it existence as such. That is 
its general charter which can be repealed at the will of the
6 •legislature." The special franchise conveys with it the power 
to use. "A special franchise is the right, granted by the public 
to use public property for a public use, but for private profit, 
such as the right to build and operate a railroad, in the streets
7.
of a city."
These early charters granted to corporations to construct 
and use railroads contained many clauses granting the power of
4. Adams, H.C., In introduction to Dixon, F.H., State Railroad
Control, Thomas Y. Crowell and Co. 1896 p. 6
5. 114 Minnesota Reports 95, 105 (1911)
6. Lord vs Equitable Life Association 194 N.Y. 212,225 (1909)
7. ibid, p ?
4
eminent domain, specifying routes, controlling construction and 
prescribing some details of operation, and length of life; some 
charters were limited as to life, but most of them ran for 99 
years or for perpetuity. In order to encourage the building of 
railroads special clauses were often inserted granting tax exemp­
tion for a period of years; while others restricted the variety 
of business and the amount of land it might hold.
The clauses dealing with rates were of three types. Usual
ly the charter took the form of a prescribed schedule of maximum
rates. A second type of charter placed a limitiation upon the net
income resulting from fares, tolls or rates. For example the 
corporation might be restricted to a 20 per cent return on their 
common stock. A third type was a type peculiar to New England 
States. These charters contained the stipulation that after a 
period of years, usually 25, but often 10 or 15, and every 20 
years after, the legislature had the power to prescribe a new 
schedule of rates if the income was greater than a specified per- 
p
centage of the corporate investment. •
Early franchises were granted almost exclusively by the
state, and many of the privileges were granted with a complete
8. In the charter granted to the Penobscot River Railroad Go. we 
find--”that a toll be, and is hereby granted and established----
and at such rates as may be established from time to time, by 
the directors of said corporation; provided that after 10 years 
from the completion of said railroad, whenever the profits aris­
ing from tolls or otherwise shall exceed the amount of 12 per cent 
per annum on the actual cost of said railroad---- then the legislat
shall from time to time have the right to so reduce such tolls 
as have been established, not below 12 per cent as aforesaid” 
Maine Acts and Resolves Ch. Ill 1836 
5
disregard, of the welfare of the local communities. The abuses that 
developed, with this indiscriminate form of grant, especially in
r 
street railway franchises, led to the granting of franchises by 
municipalities, so that they might have control over their streets 
From about 1860 to 1907 the cities became the chief franchise 
granting bodies. The development of a means of positive public 
utility regulation through the power granted to Public Service 
Commissions marks the resumption by states of the authority over 
public utilities,thus making the franchise questioh one of less 
importance. Franchises are still required of public utility 
corporations, but they need no longer to provide for all the 
contingencies of the future, if state regulation is effective.
Regulation by means of the corporate charter proved very 
ineffective, and many defects developed within this system of 
regulation.
(a) While the setting of a maximum rate by the legislature 
was provided for in the charter, this provision soon became inop­
erative, for under the stimulus of competition rates were never 
up to the maximum.
(b) It was assumed that all companies would voluntarily 
fulfill their charter obligations, and so no effective means of 
mandatory control over the actions of the companies were devised.
(c) The New England form of rate control which gave the 
legislature power to revise rates when they exceeded, a certain per 
cent of the investment, was very easily avoided by the simple 
method of padding new investment accounts or a new issue of
6
capital stock, for there were no provisions for financial ancl 
accounting control. Thus these regulatory provisions became in­
effective and. gave the railroads a status comparable to the great 
Land.' lords of the Feudal Ages, except that they had no King to 
whom tojswear allegiance.
Judicially, charter regulation has been subject to many
interpretations of the delegated power of a corporate franchise 
by a political body. At first the charter was considered, as a 
special privilege conferred by a government upon particular 
individuals or companies fortheir private profit. This concept of 
a charter"is derived from English constitutional history and'is 
associated with the monopolistic privileges granted by Queen 
Elizabeth.,"^ *
In 1819 in the famous Dartmouth case the court held that 
a charter was "a contract between the state and the grantee and 
could not be impaired by subsequent enactments of the legislature^ 
Corporations under the protection of this decision "came to en­
joy many special privileges, as exemption from taxation, regulat­
ion or competition.’ When the harmful effects of the Dartmouth 
decision became apparent to the states they sought a judicial 
means of preserving their power of regulation and taxation.
The courts set up the doctrine that "the terms of any con­
tract must be strictly construed, i.e., the abandoment of leg-
9. Glaeser, Martin G-., Outlines of Public Utility Economics,
The MacMillan Company, 1927 p. 205
10. Dartmouth College vs Woodward, 4 Wheaton 518 i
11. Glaeser., Outlines of Public Utility Economics p. 206
7
islative power must be expressly stated, and cannot be implied."
13 In the case of Charles River Bridge vs Warren Bridge ’the court 
held that an express grant of power to build a toll bridge did not 
also imply that the state might not subsequently charter a compet­
ing bridge. Similarily it has been held that the grant of special 
privileges is to the grantee alone and may not be transferred un-
14 less expressly permitted. ' Thus the concept that although a fran­
chise is a contract, it^<apiy be altered or repealed if so stipulated 
in the grant itself or in the laws of the state came into accepted 
usage.
The movement for a more flexible form of regulation than 
that offered by charters and sporadic boards of commissions, owes 
its genesis to the decay of the laissez- faire doctrine, and the 
special class of evils that became associated with the competit­
ive regime.
The laissez-faire doctrine operated under the theory 
that competition was the life of trade, and that such a system 
would work fol? the best interests of the public. Under a system 
of free competition no one would hinder anyone else from entering 
or leaving a market; thus laissez-faire was correlated with lib­
erty and the protection of property rights. Under the stimulus 
of competition price would be measured by the cost of the product. 
The theory of a "just or normal price" would work for the benefit
12. ibid. Also see State of Maine vs Maine Central Railroad 66
Maine 488, for an interpretation of a charter as a contract.
13. 11 Peters 420 (1837)
14. This is also discussed in 66 Maine 488 (see above 12.)
8
of the public, for if price went too high then competition would, 
enter the market, supply would increase and demand decrease, hence 
prices would go down. If, on the other hand, prices went too low, 
then the reverse would take place. So cost would equal normal 
price, which would be equal to justice.
The theory, however, did not work out thus in actual pract­
ice, for it assumed that cost was the same to all enterprises, C* 
whereas there are differences in cost to differnt entreprenuers. 
Again laissez-faire did not foresee that competition would lead 
to monopoly or near monopoly, and thus disrupt the whole compet­
itive schema, and in turn foster the evils of monopoly price, un­
fair competition, discriminations, and rebating which relegated 
public interest to a secondary position and put private interests 
in the drivers seat.
The doctrine of a "just price" proved to be onlj^ja myth 
t^a group of farmers in the Middle West when they felt that they 
were being forced to pay exorbitant rates for the transportation 
of their grain when the wheat market was low.
The reaction that set in to remove this special class of 
abuses against public interests led to a wave of maximum rate regul­
ation in the west and south, and finally culminated in the decis- 
ion of Munn vs Illinois which upheld the constitutionality of a 
state to prescribe a schedule of maximum rates for a business 
affected with a public interest
9
15 •In the Olcott case ’which paved the way for the Munn deois 
ion the court said, "It Jias never beer considered a matter of any 
importance that the road was built by the agency of a private 
corporation. No matter who is the agent the function performed is 
that of the state. Though the ownership is private the use is 
public."
In the United States, judicial interpretation of public 
utility regulation usually begins in 1877 with the Munn case, 
thus placing it at the threshold of the period of positive pub­
lic utility regulation. "They (the warehouses) stand, to use the 
language of the consel, in ’the very gateway of commerce1 and 
take toll from all who pass. Their business most certainly tenets 
to a common charge and is a thing of common interest.and has
16 ceased to be juris privati only." ’ This mystical formula was 
not penned by Justice Waite, , who wrote the decision of the case, 
but was quoted from Lord Chief Justice Hale more than 200 years 
before•
The court then, in justifying its decision in upholding the 
right of the state to prescribe maximum rates looked to the comm­
on law maxim of property, "that it shall not be used in a way in­
jurious to the rights of others nor to impair the public rights." 
The basis of public utility regulation is found in the 
status of private property devoted to a public use. "The term 
’private property’ is a misnomer. There is no strictly private
15. Olcott vs Supervisors 16 Wall. 695; 83 U.S. 678 (?)
16. Munn vs Illinois 94 U.S. 113
10.
interests in property enjoyed, to the complete exclusion of all
17other interests.” Property may he viewed, as control over the behav 
ior of others. There exists in property certain rights and. duties 
which determine this behavior, either toward, a limitation of those 
rights or toward, the exercising of the duties expressed in priv­
ate property. In the feudal age private property meant use, en­
joyment, and possession; buying, selling, and consumption were 
not to be found in the definition of private property. To-day 
property includes buying, selling/,; and. consumption, which leads 
to price and incOfie, so that in a commercial age private proper­
ty is associated with value.
Private property has developed from a physical to an in
tangible or valuation concept. Under the common law property was 
associated with use-value. Property rights meant the of the phy 
sical, tangible property for one’s own enjoyment. In the early 
stage of public utility regulation, the judiciary concept of 
private property was built around those doctrines that had devel 
oped out of the common law, and extenuated by those doctrines 
that developed under the system of laissez-faire, so that the dep­
rivation of "property” without ”due process of law” referred to the 
physical property being used by the corporation and not its 
exchange value.
Exchange-value has come to mean not only the use and enjoy­
ment of the property, but the right to fix a charge that will 
yield an income. ”Not merely physical things are objects of prop-
17. Hartman, H.H., Fair Value, Houghton Mifflin Co. 1920 p.3.
11
erty, 1-111 the expected earning power of those things are property; 
and property is taken from the.owner, not merely under the power 
of eminent domain which takes title and possession, hut under the 
police power which takes its exchange value. To deprive the owners 
of their exchange value is equivalent to depriving them of their 
property."18•
It is this exchange value of property which has become 
known as intangible property, and its value depends upon its right 
of access to markets. If a corporation is barred from receiving 
an income sufficient to enable it to realize a price on it in 
the exchange market as a going concern, then all that the owner 
has left is the title to the property, which means the actual 
physical property, and this may be reduced to junk value.
Thus the destruction of property rights as now defined by 
the courts, does not mean the destruction of the use, possession, 
or enjoyment of the physical property, but means the destroying 
of the intangible rights of receiving an income, of having 
bargaining power, of maintaining its exchange value on the buy­
ing and selling market•
It has become a maxim in public utility regulation that 
the power of rate regulation lies with the state legislature, 
not with the judiciary. We have seen that the Munn vs Illinois 
case arose over the questioning of the state legislature’s 
right to prescribe maximum rates, because it was contrary to the
18. Commons, John R., Legal Foundations of Capitalism, The
MacMillan Co. 1924 p.16
12
”due process of law” clause in the 14th amendment. In this case and 
subsequent cases the Supreme Court of the United States has upheld 
the constitutionality of the legislature to regulate rates where 
the public has an interest in the business. ”In countries where the 
common law prevails * it has been customary from time immemorial 
for the legislature to declare what shall be a reasonable compen-
19
sation under such circumstances,” and again ”of the propriety 
of legislative interference within the scope of legislative pow-
20.er, the legislature is the exclusive Judge.” Which grants un­
conditionally to the legislature the power to regulate rates, a 
point which since that time has never been disputed.
The extent of rate making power again arose in the case of
21.the Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy Railroad Co. vs Iowa, and in
22.
Tilly vs S.F. and W. Railroad Company. ’The decisions in these 
cases were based on that of Munn vs Illinois which rejected the 
principle of judicial review in the consideration of reasonable­
ness of rates.
About a jiecade after the Munn case, the right of the judic­
iary to review rate cases to ascertain their reasonableness arose 
in a group of cases known as the Commission Cases. The emergence 
of judicial review in rate cases placed a limitation upon the 
power of the legislature to fix rates. The issue was first present- 
ed in the Stone vs Farmers1 Loan and Trust Company case, * in
19. Munn vs Illinois 94 U.S. 113 C
20. ibid
21. 94 U.S. 155 ( 3
22. 5 Fed.641 C )
23. 116 U.S. 307 / 1
13
which the court said, "from what has been thus said, it is not to 
be inferred that this power of limitation or regulation is itself 
without limit. This power to regulate is not a power to destroy 
and limitation is not the equivalent of confiscation. Under pret-
/
ense of regulating fares and freight, the state cannot require a ? 
railroad corporation to carry persons or property without reward;
neither can it do that which in law amounts to taking of private 
property for public use without just compensation, or without 
due process of law."
24Subsequent cases tended to more firmly intrench the con­
cept that legislative power of regulation is subject to limitat­
ion, and that limitation is the confiscatory analogy as applied 
in the due process of law clause of the 14th Amendment to the 
constitution of the United States.
Although there sprang up a widespread movement for the 
establishment of commissions by the states, the movement did not 
make a great deal of headway until about 1905. Due to the depress­
ion of 1873 all the earlier commissions were repealed except that 
of Illinois. With the establishment of the Interstate Commerce
Commission in 1887 the movement for fctate commissions was resumed, 
and by means of new laws and successive amendments to old laws, 
the movement for a strong type of commission continued unabated.
About 1905 another reform and expansion movement set in in 
the movement for a strong public utilities commission. The earlier
24. Low vs Beidelman 125 U.S. 680, and Chicago, Milwaukee and
St. Paul Railroad Co. vs Minnesota 134 U.S. 418 
14
type of commission held sway only over common carriers. The new 
commissions as set up in Wisconsin and New York extended their 
power over the electric railways, gas utilities, water utilities, 
electric and power utilities, and telephone utilities.
Since then the movement for state commissions has spread 
rapidly over the country, so that now in every state, except 
Delaware, there exists some form of a state public service comm­
ission looking to the public utility as a problem upon which 




For thirty years valuation methods hi 
varied, interpretations, both by the 
subject of public utility economics.
has arisen in the attempt to establish a universal method of 
valuation for public utilities is traced to a rather general 
statement made in the United States Supreme Court decision of 
Smyth vs Ames in 1898.
From the Munn vs Illinois decision in 1877, which first 
upheld the state1s right to determine reasonableness of rates, 
to the Smyth vs Ames decision no definite rule for determining 
the reasonableness of rates had ever been brought into existence. 
In the Ames case, however, the federal rule was enunciated that 
the fair value of the property used. in|the public service con­
stituted the measure upon which a reasonable return could be 
earned.
: The court then went on to lay down a criterion of reason­
ableness; "And in order to ascertain that value, the original cost 
of construction, the amount expended in permanent improvements, 
the amount and market value of its bonds and stocks, the present 
as compared with the original cost of construction, the probable 
earning capacity under particular rates prescribed by statute, 
and the sum required to meet operating expenses, are all matters 
of consideration, and are to be given such weight as may be Just 
and right in each case."1* 
1. 169 U.S. 466, 546-547
16
Although this statement is too general to determine a method of 
valuation due to much overlapping of some factors, and the in­
clusion of many irrevelant factors that do not enter into fair
2.
value, three general methods have developed out of the struggle 
to determine what is to be a fair value upon which a fair rate 
of return is to be earned.
A. Market Value.
One of the rules for determining fair value suggested in 
the decision of Smyth vs Ames is the "market value of the out­
standing stocks and bonds." Market value may be conceived in 
two senses. First, it may mean as the rule states, the market 
value of the securities of the public utility. The market value 
as thus conceived is found by adding up the value of the stocks 
and bonds as registered on the stock and bond market. Market value 
is also conceived as the capitalization of the net earnings of the 
company at the prevailing rate of interest. Thus if the net 
earnings of a company are $7,000 and the rate of return for 
this particular utility is 7^, then the market value of the com­
pany is $100,000.
The market value of stocks and bonds as registered on 
the stock and bond market is untenable for rate making purposes, 
for it represents too variable a factor. Stocks and bonds are 
2. "The probable earning capacity of the company under the par­
ticular rates prescribed by statute and the sum required to pay 
operating expenses, are important categories in judging whether 
the rates are adequate to earn a fair return on a fair value, 
but do not enter into the determination of fair value itself." 
Bauer, John, Effective Regulation of Public Utilities, The 
MacMillan Company, 1925 p. 71
17
easily influenced by the conditions of trade, legislation, and 
the temper of the buying public who may speculate in public 
utility securities on the expectation of future earnings. Booms 
and panics will cause wide fluctuations in the market value of 
securities, so that the use of market value would necessitate 
a continuous shifting of the rate base to meet the fluctuations 
as shown by the stoc^nd bond market.
It has been claimed that "the market value represents the
crystallization of the best judgment of the market as to the
3.
value of the property." We are not interested, however, in det 
ermining what a particular utility will sell for on the open
market as shown by its outstanding stocks and bonds, and that
added intangible asset we call "goodwill". We afe interested,
rather, in determining what shall be the rate base upon which
the utility is allowed by law to earn a "fair return"; and in
order to arrive at a rate base which shall be a "fair value", 
we look to the cost of the investment to the owner, not the
rate me
repress it as may be shown by its stocks
and boi id bond market, 
mings also means exchange value,
and her a measure of fair value. The
seller 5 the full value of his property,




of Public Utilities, The MacMillan 
n, however, do not believe that
a measure of fair value for
18
his investment. The public is not interested, in what the seller 
may get for his property, or whether the buyer earns the return 
that he expects on his investment; it is interested in securing 
reasonable rates and. adequate service. "In attempting to promote 
public good., even at the expense of private rights, we recognize 
but two limitations, that imposed, by the 14th Amendment, and that 
dictated by the necessity of attracting capital or abandoning
4 e
private operation?
"In the case of competitive industries it is generally 
held that the value of a business is chiefly determined by the 
capitalization of its annual earnings, allowance being made for 
the state of the money market at the time and the estimated 
risk of the enterprise. Whatever the merits of this, the system 
is certainly not applicable to the problem of valuing public 
enterprises for rate making purposes. For actiial or expected 
earnings are largely dependant upon the rates that are^o be 
set; and hence to determine rates bases upon a valuation based
5 • on earnings is to become involved in a circle that has no end."
If the exchange value is equal to the fair value of the 
utility,then you will always get a fair rate of return on the 
fair value of the property. Suppose for example that the net 
earnings of an enterprise are $7,000 and the rate of return for 
this particular utility is set at 7^>. Then the fair value and 
the exchange value of this utility is $100,000. Now if the amount
4. Hartman, Fair Value, p. 86
5. Progress and Poverty in Current Literature on Valuation by 
J.0. Bonbright, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Feb. 1926 
19
of the return were reduced to $6,000 and 70 is still a fair rate oi 
return, then the market value and the fair value of the property 
would not be $100,000, but approximately $85,700. Now let us 
suppose further that the fair value of this particular utility, 
based on original cost of construction is found to be $100,000, 
and the fair rate of return that’ this utility should earn is 70. 
Thus itjis seen that the market value equals its original cost.
Let us further suppose that the fair value of this utility, based 
on reproduction cost new basis is found to be $200,000. Then the 
return at a fair rate of 70 would be $14,000. Capitalizing 
$14,660 at 70 would equal $200,000, so that the market value of 
this utility is equal to its reproduction cost, which we have 
assumed is its fair value.
Thus it follows that the exchange value of a public ut­
ility is always equal to its "fair value", whether its rate base 
be determined by its original cost of construction,ot reproduction 
cost. The market value depends lipon the rate of return allowed 
on the "fair value" of the utility.
B. Original Cost.
The two most favored methods of valuation used to-day 
are (1) original cost and (2) reproduction cost.
Original cost like market value is used in two senses.
The earlier concept of original cost meant the actual cost of the 
property now employed for the public convenience; it is the orig­
inal cost of the present property that is sought. To determine 
the cost of the present property it is necessary first to make a 
20
physical inventory of all the units of property. Having secured, 
an inventory, the next step is to ascertain what these units cost 
at the date of their construction or installation. The facts can 
usually be found in the books of the company, but because many 
companies were organized before any systematic accounting proced­
ure came into use, it is not always possible to find all these 
desired facts from the books of the company. In that ease it'ls 
necessary to reach an approximation of the unit costs by refer­
ence to price records and other data. Having determined the unit 
prices to be used, it is next necessary to deduct from the total 
inventory figure the depreciation on the property, for it is not 
new and hence has been subject to wear and tear through use. 
Finally certain costs which are not disclosed tn the physical 
inventory m ust be allowed for. These intangible items are known 
as overhead charges, and include organization expenses, engineer­
ing and superintendence, taxes during construction, omissions 
and contingencies, and cost of financing. The determination of 
the cost of these overhead charges cause the major disputes in 
valuation work. Everyone has his own concept of the relative 
weight to be applied to these special items, and so it is hard 
to reach an agreement.
Original cost is also conceived as the amount actually 
invested in the enterprise from the beginning. This theory seekd 
to determine the prudent or unimpaired investment in the enter­
prise. The determination of the rate base under the prudent
21
investment theory is simply an accounting proposition.
The prudent investment theory has been developed by a 
few individuals rather than by the courts. Dr. John Bauer and 
Justice Brandeis are two of the leading authorities on the prud­
ent investment theory, so that the following discussion will be 
drawn rather liberally from their views.
"The prime requisite of a good rate base is that it shall 
be fixed and def inite ’The investment is the amount of money
actually paid into the corporate treasury by the original pur­
chasers of the corporate securities. It is this monetary capital 
which, in their opinion, is placed at the service of the public, 
and not the property which is purchased with this money.
’’The thing devoted by the investor to the public use is 
not specific property, tangible and Intangible, but capital em­
barked in the enterprise. Upon the capital so invested the Feder­
al Constitution guarantees to the utility the opportunity to earn 
a fair return. Thus, it sets the limit to the power of the state 
to regulate rates. The constitution does not guarantee to the 
utility the opportunity to earn?a return on the value of all 
items of property used by the utility, or on any of them. The 
several items of property constituting the utility, taken singly 
and freed from the public use, may conceivably have an aggregate 
value greater than if the items were used in combination. The owner 
is at liberty, in the absence of controlling statutory provis­
ions, to withdraw his property from the public service; and if
6. Bauer, Effective Regulation of Public Utilities p.104 ^7
22
he does so, may obtain for it an exchange value---- • But so long
as the specific items of property are employed by the utility,
7 
their exchange value is not of legal significance.” ’
As it is practically impossible to discover the actual 
past investment for the majority of public utilities, the first 
necessary step would be to make an appraisal of each company’s 
property at the actual or reasonable cost of installation, 
from which accrued depreciation would be deducted, and the final 
result would be accepted as the net monetary investment in the 
utility’s property unaffected by changes in the level of prices.
The figure would then have to be subject to adjustments 
to meet any requirements as to the fair treatment of the common 
stockholders. In the light of this valuation, the books of the 
company would be rewritten, and the results of the appraisal 
shown in the accounts. The initial rate base, once determined and 
adjusted, would be fixed and unchanged for the future, and the 
return would be based upon this initial figure, as found, plus 
actual future investments; and all extensions and improvements 
would be included in the accounts at actual cost under commission 
supervision. ’’Under this procedure, there would be no question 
at any time as to the amount on which the investors are entitled 
to a return. Moreover, the rate base as thus determined, would be 
coupled up consistently with the policy of charging depreciation 
to operating expenses. There would be no possibility of giving
7. Dissenting opinion of Justice Brandeis in Southwestern 
Telephone case. 262 U.S. 276, 290 (1923)
the investors an advantage in accumulating an excessive depreciat 
ion reserve, nor would the investors be penalized if for a short 
period of time the reserves should be inadequate. The purpose 
would be to eliminate any cause of dispute as to the amount of 
the investment, the rights of the investors, and the obligations
o
of the consumer.” ’
0. Reproduction Cost.
Reproduction cost like original cost and market value
is used in more than one sense. It is sometimes used to mean 
the cost of reproducing the property on the assumption that the 
property is new, and not depreciated. During a period of rising 
price levels the value of the property, based upon this theory, 
would be greatly appreciated. For this reason cost new basis is 
greatly favored by the public utilities, but has been frowned on 
by both the courts and public utility commissions. The death 
blow to cost new basis was served in the decision of the City of
9.
Knoxville vs Knoxville Water Company , in which the court said, 
"the cost of reproduction (new) is one way of ascertaining the 
present fair value of a plant— but that test would lead to 
obvious incorrect results, if the cost of reproduction is not 
diminished by the depreciation which has come from use and age."
It is obvious that a cost new basis is wholly adverse 
to the public interest theory, and so such a basis for fixing a
8. Bauer, Effective Regulation of Public Utilities p. 245
9. 212 U.S. 1,9 (1909)
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rate base<^y be dismissed without further consideration.*
Reproduction cost, as used in present valuation work, 
means the cost of reproducing the property in its depreciated 
condition. Reproduction cost less depreciation conveys differ­
ent meanings to different people, because of the different means 
employed to determine unit prices.
As in original cost it is first necessary to make an in­
ventory of all the property used and useful in the public ser­
vice, and then deduct the allowance made for depreciation. Be­
sides the actual physical properties, working capital, materials 
and supplies, etc. must be included in the inventory. The invent­
ory having been made the question now arises as to what nn51 
price is going to be employed. Are we to reproduce the property 
at present prices of material, land, and labor, or at normal 
prices measured over a five or ten year period preceeding the 
valuation, or are we going to reproduce the property under the 
actual conditions that existed when the property was constructed?
The law of the court has been that for the purpose of 
fixing rates "the value of the property is to be determined as 
of the time the inquiry is made. If the property which legally 
enters into the consideration of the question of rates has in­
creased in value since it was acquired, the company is entitled
10."Reproduction  cost (new) has been pushed forward, mainly by 
speculatively inclined corporation managers as a plausible 
theory for determining ’fair value’- a plan which, if successful, 
qould in these days of increasing prices, work out the most gigant 
ic stock watering scheme ever devised by the ingenuity of man" 
Andrews, V.W. The Utilities Magazine, 1, p.30 (1916)
25
11.to the benefit of such increase.” ’And. again, ”the making of a 
just return for the use of the property involves the recognition 
of its Fair Value if it be more than its cost. The property,is 
held in private ownership and it is that property, and not the 
original cost of it, of which the owner may not be deprived with-
12out due process of law.”
While the court has held that present fair value is to be 
determined by prices at the time the valuation is made, the
• more general mile is to use a normal cost basis measured over 
a period of five or ten years. In the McCardle case, however, 
the majority decision held for”spot” reproduction cost. That is, 
the valuation should be based upon the prices of land, labor and 
material, as of the time the inquiry was made. Justice Brandeis, 
who wrote the dissenting opinion of this decision was opposed 
to ”spot” reproduction on the grounds that ”the search for 
fair value can hardly be aided by a hypothetical estimate of 
the cost of replacing the plant at a particular moment, when 
actual reproduction would require a period that must be meas­
ured by years. "Spot” reproduction would be impossible of accom-
13.plishment without the aid of Aladdin’s lamp.”
This case has tended to widen the breach between Comm­
ission and Supreme Court interpretations of present value. The 
commissions have stressed the point that if present value is
11. Wilcox vs Co nsolidated Gas Co. 212 U.S. 19 (1909)
12. Minnesota Rate Case 230 U.S. 454 (1913)
13. Justice Brandeis, in his dissenting opinion in McCardle 
vs Indianapolis Water Co. 272 U.S. 400,423-424 (1926)
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not measured by a normal cost basis the rate base will represent 
an exaggerated figure. The court, in this particular case, how­
ever, seems to have interpreted rather narrowly the decisions of 
the Consolidated Gas case, ’and the Minnesota Rate case, ’ that 
the value of the property is to be determined as of the time the 
inquiry is to be made, and the company is to receive the benefits 
of any increase in value that may have resulted due to an in­
crease in the price level. This controversy between normal cost 
basis and "spot” reproduction is still an unsettled issue and 
may flame anew in the near future.
Reproduction cost must also take into consideration the 
intangible properties which enter into the final cost of the 
corporation as a going concern. These special items, such as 
overhead charges, going value, franchise value, and working 
capital, as in original cost, cause the greatest number of 
disputes between the utility company and the commissioners in 
arriving as a final figure based on reproduction cost.
The struggle in the search for a method of fair value 
has been greatly hampered by what statisticians call a general 
price level. The past forty years has seen many marked fluctu­
ations in the general price level, and these fluctuating tend­
encies have made themselves felt in the controversy between the 
utilization of the original cost theory as against the reprod­
uction cost theory as a measure of fair value.
Following the Civil War prices declined steadily until
14. See supra 11, p.25
15. See supra 12, p.25
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about 1900, so that the Smyth vs Ames decision of 1898 which 
first advanced the doctrine of a "fair return on a fair value" 
came in the very trough of the price level, as may be seen from 
the graphical representation of public utility regulation and 
the changing price level, on the opposite page.
In this case (Smyth vs Ames) the railroad argued for the 
investment in terms of securities as the basis upon which rates 
should be determined. The State of Nebraska argued for reprod­
uction cost. The court in its decision decided for neither the 
one or the other basis, but rendered a Solomonic judgment by 
enumerating several factors that should be given due consider­
ation in determining the "fair value of the property used and 
useful in the service of the public."
This opposition of views continued until about 1910, 
when these contradictory views swapped hands, so to speak. The 
public utilities agreed to reproduction basis as a measure of 
fair value, but the public now began to argue for the original 
cost basis in valuation work. Now (1932) all indications point 
to another change in views regarding the method to be employed 
in determining what is the fair value of a public utility,
These periodic changes in views as to what shall be the 
measure of the rate base may be explained by both the price-lev- 
el and the conflict between public welfare and private interests.
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With a steady declining price-level as was the situation 
from 1865 to 1900, the utilties naturally looked to the orig­
inal cost of construction as the fair measure for a rate base, 
for the properties had been constructed and developed during a 
period when prices were high. To base the valuation on anything 
but this basis would give them such a low valuation that they 
would be unable to earn the reasonable return necessary to pay 
their fixed charges, and to attract sufficient capital to prov­
ide for improvements and replacements • In other words it would 
lead to confiscation of property contrary to the Tdue process 
of law1 clause of the 14th Amendment. The public, on the other 
hand, looking to cheaper rates, argued that the'utilties were 
entitled only to a fair return on the property used and useful 
for the convenience of the public, and that the property should 
be valu*,ed on the cost of reproducing it at the present day 
cost of materials and labor. The public also argued that the 
original cost of construction figure was too high because the 
railroads especially, had secured their land free by liberal 
land grants, and that the capital stock contained much water 
and was no evidence of the true cost of original construction.
With the upturn of the price level from 1900 to 1921, 
during which occured the great upheavel in prices due to the 
World War, the public utilities from 1910 looked to the re­
production cost as the measure of fair value. If they (the 
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public utilities) were to continue giving service to the public, 
then their rate base must be increased, for during a period when 
the price of materials and labor was abnormally high, the rate 
of return must be in accord with this increase in the cost of 
service or else their financial stability would be undermined 
and the confiscation of their property vzould result.
With the present day decline in prices a new situation
14.
arises. In the O’Fallon case the railroads won their fight for 
reproduction cost when the Supreme Court of the United States 
decreed that the Interstate Commerce Commission did not give 
sufficient allowance for reproduction cost. At the recent House 
Committee hearing on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on the 
proposed repeal of the recapture clause of the Transportation 
Act of 1920, which was passed to act as a check on inflated 
capitalization of railroads, it was stated that the railroads, 
due to the decline in prices since the O’Fallon decision, no 
longer seem to care to stress the elements of reproduction cost 
and are now turning to original cost as the measure of fair valued
What the future holds for valuation is hard to say, but 
it will be of interest to see whether the courts will continue 
to hold for the reproduction cost basis, or will swing over to 
the original cost as a basis of determining fair value. If this 
conjecture should actually result, then it would seem that the
14. St. Louis and O’Fallon Railroad Company vs Interstate Comm­
erce Commission 279 U.S. 461 (1929)
15. See Article "Valuation Again” in Hew York Times, Sunday
Feb. 21, Financial Section 6n
30
public always stands to lose and the utilities to gain in the 
controversy over the measure for fair value. It is a poor theory 
that does not work both ways. Perhaps the trouble is with the 
theory, not the failure in developing a consistent policy, and 
we should look for a more equitable measure of fair value, un­
influenced by a changing pri^e level.
31.
A Survey of Public Utility Regulation in Maine
A. Prior to 1914
It is customary to speak of regulation by statd commiss­
ioners as beginning about 1905. This date is often denoted as 
the dividing line between laissez-faire economics and the period 
of positive public utility regulation. The Granger reaction 
which began with legislation to prescribe maximum rates and 
fares and prohibit discrimination is regarded as the initiating 
factor in the gradual development of a strong and comprehensive 
form of state commissions looking to the regulation of that field 
of economic enterprise which to-day we term ’’Public Utilities” .
Historically this view is inaccurate, because the commiss­
ion as an agent of regulation had been developed and was in use 
in Maine and other New England states long before the drums that 
roused the grangers to action had ever been heard on the wind.
Railroads, because of their business of a common carrier, 
almost from the first were singled out as being affected with a 
public interest. Such early supervisory control as was exercised 
by the legislature did not look to the economic phases of regulat­
ion, but was confined to a much narrower scope, that of regulation 
in behalf of the public health and safety.
A survey of regulation in Maine, prior to 1914, leads us 
into two fields of regulatory endeavor, both having their individ­
ual and concomitant aspects. These two devices of regulation 
were (1) regulation by means of the corporate franchise, and (2) 
regulation by the Board of Railroad Commissioners.
Franchises were granted under the general law by the legis­
lature, and were known as general franchises; or by special leg­
islation, and thus became known as special franchises. The general 
franchise was the type of franchise usually granted to steam 
railroads, while the specia^franchises were granted by municipal­
ities, through the legislature, to street railroads in order 
that they might exercise control over the use of their streets.
The General Franchise
To avdid the binding effects of the Dartmouth decision
1.
of 1819 which declared a franchise to be a contract between 
the state and the corporation which could not be impaired by 
further legislative enactments, the State of Maine in 1831, 
passed a law "that all acts of incorporation which shall be 
passed after the passage of this act, shall, at all times here­
after, be liable to be amended, altered, or repealed at the 
pleasure of the legislature, in the same manner as if an express 
provision to that effect were therein contained; unless there 
shall have been inserted in such act of incorporation an express
2 •limitation or provision to the contrary."
The general franchise granted by the Maine Legislature 
typifies the New England form of franchise which is distinctly 
different from the franchises granted to corporations in other
1. See above p.6
2. Maine Laws, Vol.Ill 1831 Ch.503
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sections of the country.
The rate of t611 that a railroad might charge was left 
to the discretion of the company. It was provided, however, that 
after a period of years, usually ten, from the time of the com­
pletion of the road, and anytime thereafter the rates of toll would 
be subject to be altered and regulated at the pleasure of the 
legislature. Many franchises contained the provision that after 
a period of ten years or more from the date of the completion of 
the road, and any time thereafter, whenever the profits arising 
from tolls exceeded a certain percentage per annum on the actual 
cost of the railroad, then the legislature has the right to reduce 
the established tolls, but not below the specified percentage of 
return. (The specified percentage of profits per annum to be 
allowed was usually between 10 percent and 12 percent)
It is interesting to note that in 1874 the state passed 
an act imposing a tax of li percent on the value of the corpor- 
ate franchise. ’The value of the franchise was determined by 
deducting from the market value of the stock the assessed value 
of the real estate taxed by the cities and towns.
The Maine Central Railroad refused to pay the tax, claim­
ing that it was a violation of the original charter, and that 
these charters were contracts between the state and the railroad 
company which could not be changed. The railroad further claimed 
that when the net income exceeds ten percent of the cost, the 
legislature can take for the state any portion of the excess and
3. Maine Acts and Resolves 1874 Ch. 258
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that no other tax shall ever be assessed on the corporation or 
on any of its priveleges or franchises, but when the levying of 
the tax causes the net income to fall below ten percent then it 
is a breach of the contract.
The case went to the Maine Supreme Court, which upheld 
the power of the state to levy the tax. The Court in granting 
its decision said, "When two or more corporations with a special 
immunity from general taxation---- , are incorporated into a new
corporation which is unable, and is not required, to do or perform 
the acts which must precede such special taxation, the new corp­
oration as thus created cannot claim the special immunity belong­
ing to the corporation out of which it was composed---- That, as
4.
such new corporations, they are subject to the law of 1831 
which has continued in force to the present time, and consequently
5
they are liable to taxation." *
The franchise also specified the course that the rail­
road was to follow and gave the corporation the power of eminent 
domain.
While the capitalization of the corporation was provided 
for in the franchise, the amount and par value of the capital 
stock contained therein was not inserted by the legislature, but 
by the corporation. That is, while the charter might state that 
the capital stock was to be say, $100,000 or not less than $1,000 
or more than $100,000, as it was sometimes stated, this amount
4. See above p.33,for a full statement bf this law.
5. 66 Maine 488,514 )
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was fixed at the first meeting of the incorporators, and not by 
the legislature. This is provided for under the general corporat­
ion law. The Maine Supreme Court has held that "if a legislative / 
charter does not fix the number of shares of the capital stock, 
it is presumed that the legislature intended that the stockholders
6.
or directors should fix the number? and again, "the legislature 
has not retained the power to determine the number of shares nor
7. 
bestowed it upon anyone else---- . The corporation alone can do it".
If the amount of capital stock originally contained in the charter 
was insufficient to carry out the corporate purposes, the corpor­
ation would ask to have the charter amended, but the amount of 
the increase was determined at a meeting of the stockholders duly 
called for that purpose, and not hy the legislature.
Under this system no protection was given to the investors 
from stock watering. The amount of capital stock stipulated in 
the franchise might be in excess of what was needed to carry on 
construction work, and there was nothing to prevent the directors 
from watering the Remaining amount if they desired to do so.
Bonds might be issued, but not above the amount of ce/pital 
stock paid in to the corporation, secured in any manner the 
directors deemed expedient. The par value was fixed, usually at 
$50 or $100, and the rate of interest was not to be over 6 percent.





The charter granted to the Augusta ard Hallowell Railroad
8.
Company in 1868 typifies the charters granted to municipalities 
and public utilities by special acts of the legislature.
The charter granted the company permission to use the 
streets with the restriction that the location should "from time 
to time be fixed and determined by the municipal officers---- and
9assented to in writing by said corporation." * The rate of toll 
to be charged was left to the discretion of the company. In 
some instances, however, the franchise contained the schedule 
of tolls that the company was to charge.^‘The franchise was 
limited as to duration. The original location d>f the route was 
to run for 25 years. At the expiration of the life of the chart­
er it might be renewed from time to time for a term not exceed­
ing 25 years at one time, by the municipal officers.
The municipal officers of the cities of Augusta and Hallow­
ell were given power at all times to regulate the rate of speed, 
the mode and use of the tracks, to make provisions for the remov­
al of snow and ice from the streets, roads and highways of the com­
pany at its expense; also to see that the company kept in repair 
the portions of the streets occupied by the railroadTs tracks, 
within the limits of the city. The provisions regarding capitaliz­
ation for the company were similiar to those contained in the 
general franchise.
Maine Acts and Eesolves 1868 ch. 450
10.See Franchise of Waterville and Fairfield R.R. Co. Maine Acts 
and Resolves 1835 ch.611
9 . ibid sec. 1
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An analysis of these two types of franchises, the general 
and the special, show that the former were subject to more reg­
ulation of rates and profits than the latter, while in the manner 
of service and location, the special franchises were subject to 
a much wider range of regulation. Neither type exercised any con­
trol over securities, for as we have seen above, the legislature 
had never retained the power to determine the number of shares 
that a corporation might issue, nor had it bestowed this power 
upon anyone else.
This absence of control over security issues made the 
franchise regulation of rates and profits ineffective, for the 
corporation could always pad its investment accounts to show that 
it was earning only the amount of return stipulated in the fran­
chise. It wasregulation by the special franchise that gave chart­
er regulation its significance, but as seen, this regulation was 
limited to a narrow scope, that of service, location, and any­
thing else that the cities could get out of the utilities in the 
form of free passes to police, reduced fares to school children, 
street pavements, or a corporation tax, usually a per cent of the 
gross earnings.
The Board of Railroad Commissioners
The first attempt at any form of regulatory machinery over 
public utilities, in Maine, was the formation of the Board of 
Railroad Commissioners in 1858.This was merely an act to sec- 
11. Maine Acts and Resolves 1858 ch.36 
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ure the safety and convenience of travelers on the railroads9.The 
act provided, that ”the governor, with the advice of the council 
shall appoint three railroad commissioners to act as a board, and
12to hold office for three years.” ’ Two of the commissioners were 
to be experienced in the operation and management of railroads, 
and. one was to be experienced In the construction of railroads. 
Their compensation was to be five dollars a day while actually 
employed in their official duties, to be paid by the railroads 
on which the services were rendered. Later the act stipulated 
that one of the commissioners was to be learned in lav; and was 
to act as chairman. It was to have an expense account of $3200 
a year to provide for maps, reports, and stationary; to pay
13 stenographers, and to hire mechanical engineers to test bridges.
The commission was to have authority ■fro^examine into the 
condition of railroads in the state, their rate of speed, their 
rolling stock, time tables, the times and terms of connection and 
junction or crossing, and the rates at which passengers and mer­
chandize, coming from one road are transported over another; to 
the end that the public safety and convenience in the transportat-
14ion might be provided for and secured. *
In 1874 Governor Dingley, in his address to the legislature, 
recognized the limitations of the power of the railroad commission 
when he said,”In authorizing the formation of railroad corporations 
hereafter,---- care should, be taken to include such provisions as
12.ibid sec.l
13. Revised Statutes 1903 ch.51 sec 48
14. Acts and Resolves 1858 ch 36 sec.2
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will remove all doubts as to the right of the state to exercise 
such supervision as the public interest may require. Existing 
laws, as it seems to me, fail to confer upon the railroad comm- 
ission powers which are essential to secure the convenience, even 
if they do the safety of the public".
From time t© time the power of the commission was extend­
ed and added to by successive legislative enactments. In 1874 
it was provided that the railroads were to make an annual report 
to the commission, and the report was to include amo^&ig other 
things, the length of the road, capital sto«k, whole cost of 
the road, amount and nature of its indebtedness and dues, whole 
cost of operating, average number of tons of freight per train, 
whole number of stockholders, and the amount of each dividend 
and when paid. (Acts and Resolves 1878 ch.218) In 1877 it was 
provided that the railroad commission should provide a form of 
return uniform for all railroads in the state. The form of 
return was designed to produce uniformity in the annual rail­
road returns of all railroads in New England. (Acts and Resolves 
1877 ch.207) And again in in 1891 it was provided that the form 
of return should be the same as that required by the Interstate 
Commerce Commission. (Acts and Resolves 1891 ch.6) In 1899 the 
authority of the commission was extended to act upon petitions 
of extensions of railroad lines,(Acts and Resolves 1899 chf71), 
and in the same year the power to act upon a petition for approv­
al for the location of railroads was added to their
15. Maine Acts and Resolves 1874 Governor’s Address.
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duties, (ch.117) These extensions of power conferred on the 
commission did not have any mention of regulation over securities, 
valuation or rates, "but were merely amendments to the act of 
1858 to provide for the safety and convenience of passengers on 
railroads. The requirement for a uniform annual report by the 
railroads may be viewed aa an important piece of legislation in 
that it tended to keep the accounts of the railroads in good 
order, which facilitates the work of the public utilities comm­
ission of to-day in their valuation work.
It has been said that "the regulation of security 
issues forms the very cornerstone of public regulation. The 
theory and :policy of regulation follow from, and are based upon, 
the regulation of security issues. The control of capitalization 
is highly desirable, if not an indispensable, concomitant of 
governmental regulation of the operations and charges of public
16.service corporations”.
With this thought in mind we might well inquire into the 
nature and extent of security regulation in Maine prior to 1914, 
either by means of the corporate franchise and general laws, or 
as shown in the power invested in the early railroad commission, 
by the state legislature.
In our discussion above of security regulation by means 
of the corporate charter we noted that the legislature exercised 
no continuous control over corporate securities. The stockholders
16. Bullock, Control of Capitalization of Public Service Corp­
orations of Massachusetts. Publications of the American Economic 
Association 3rd series x (1909) p.384 
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decided on the amount of the capital stock to be issued, and the 
directors used the funds paid in for these securities for any 
purpose they deemed expedient or not expedient as the case may 
have been. To find any positive attempt on the part of the legis­
lature to regulate security issues we must look at two laws, one 
passed in 1897, and the other in 1901, which were designed to 
place some measure of control over the issuance of capital stock, 
hitherto non-existant.
The law of 1897 ’provided that an increase in capital 
stock must be for some lawful purpose, such as the building of a 
branch railroad track, to aid in the construction of another 
railroad, for the building of stations, for making permanent 
improvements, for paying its funded debt, or for paying its 
floating debt. The increase however, must first be authorized 
by a vote of the majority of the stock present or represented, 
at a legal meeting of the corporation called for that purpose. 
The directors of the corporation must then petition the rail­
road commision for the increase, who were then to file a certif­
icate in the office of the Secretary of State showing th^ amount 
of the increase authorized and the purpose for which the proceeds 
from the sale of stock were to be used. The corporation was for­
bidden to use the proceeds for any purpose not specified, in the 
certificate, and if they did so were to be enjoined from so doing 
by an application from the Board of Railroad Commissioners or 
any interested party,
Maine Acts and Resolves 1897 ch. 186
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18In 1901 additional control over securities was provided.
This act provided that when the capital stock of a railroad corp­
oration was increased it was to be offered first to the stock­
holders in proportion to the amount of stock they owned. If the 
stock was not taken within fifteen days of the pu blished notice 
regarding the increase, then the unsubscribed for stock was to 
be sold by the directors of the corporation at auction. The time 
and place of the auction were to be prescribed by the railroad 
commission. Ko shares "were to be issued or sold for a less sum, to 
be actually paid in cash, than the par value thereof". If, however, 
the incr^se did not exceed 4 per cent of the existing capital 
stock, then the directors did not first have to offer the same 
to the stockholders but might proceed to sell it at auction.
The issuance of bonds was not subject to a very wide 
range of regulation. The corporate franchise usually specified 
the amount and par value of the bonds, the relation of bonded 
indebtedness to capital stock, the rate of interest, and in 
some instances the maturity of the issue. It was provider by 
statute that bonds might be issued and sold at sums not less than 
$100, bearing interest at not over 6 per cent, to be secured in 
such manner as the directors deemed expedient, and "binding on
19it though sold at less than par value”.
These laws of 1897 and 1901 not only recognized the prev-
18. Maine Acts and Resolves 1901 ch. 173
19. Revised Statutes 1871 ch. 51 sec.28 
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ions limitation on security regulation but provided, a means of > 
securing more continuous attention to new issues of capital stock, 
and thus protected more fully the interest of the investor. Any 
interest that the public might have in securing additional control 
over securities, however, was of a minor consideration. People 
were still living under the laissez-faire system, and while they 
had been granted some interests in the affairs of a public util­
ity, they had not been granted the right to inquire into all 
phases of its operation. The intent of these laws seems to have 
been to affect control over the disposal of the securities in the 
interest of the investor, and not the amount of the issue which 
would be the primary interest of the public. While these laws 
defined the method by which these new issued of securities were 
to be disposed of, and made it encumbent upon the commission to 
see that the funds realized from the sale of these securities 
were used only for the lawful purposes enumerated in their petit­
ion, it failed to define any principles that would guide the 
commission in deciding whether or not the issue should be auth­
orized. The only means that the commission had of determining the 
financial structure of the railroad was through the reports which, 
from 1877, the railroads had been required to submit annually. 
These reports might or might not show the equity in the corporat­
ion upon which the new issue of securities was to be issued. So 
for this reason, security issues, while they did become subject 
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to some continuous and systematic control, were not entirely 
sufficiently or effectively regulated.
The Board of Railroad Commissioners was never an 
effective regulatory machine. It was merely a fact finding comm­
ission with powers to investigate into the affairs of railroads 
and make recommendations. It had no power to enforce its orders 
except through the general court, a cumbersome and ineffective 
procedure. Its jurisdiction extended only to railroads, and its 
maimpurpose was to secure the safety and convenience of passeng­
ers on the railroads. It had no jurisdiction over the rates which 
a railroad might charge. The greater part of its efforts were 
spent in the inspection of the physical properties of the rail­
road, deciding on new locations, the investigation of accidents, 
discriminations, and rebating, and it was usually hampered in 
this work by the lack of financial resources, probably the two 
most important powers conferred upon this commission,in the light 
of present day regulation, was that of requiring the railroads 
to submit uniform annual returns, and that of supervising the 
disposal of new issues of corporate securities. When this board 
went out of office in 1914 it was still a fact finding commission 
to secur^jthe safety and convenience of passengers on railroads. 
Thus the scope of the Board of Railroad Commissioners was never 
extended beyond the narrow field of regulation in behalf of 
public health and safety•
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Regulation of other Utilities
The regulation of gas and. electrio&l companies, telephone 
and. telegraph companies, and. water companies, utilities which 
to-day receive the greatest amount of attention by the public 
utilties commission were, before 1914, subject to no other regulat­
ory provisions than those provided. for in the corporate franchise 
and a few statutory enactments. Most of these utilities are 
comparatively ndw to society, and their greatest growth has come 
during the past twenty years.
- In 1901 the legislature recognized, in part, the monopol­
istic character of gas and electrical companies when it decreed 
that, "no corporation so organized, shall have authority without 
special act of the legislature, to make, generate, sell, distrib­
ute, or supply gas or electricity or both, for any purpose, in 
or to any city or town, in or to which another company, person 
or firm are making, generating, selling, distributing, or supply­
ing, or are authorized to make, sell, generate, distribute or
20 • supply gas or electricity or both."
From a study of the franchises granted to these utilities 
we find that they were essentially the same as those granted to 
street railways. The regulatory provisions of these franchises 
were those pertaining t*o the use of the streets of the city or 
town within which the corporation was carrying on its business.
20. Maine Acts and Resolves 1901 ch. 273
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The utility company might lay lines of wire upon, under, or over 
a street, hut only under the direction of the municipal officers; 
pipes and. acqueducts might be laid down subject to the restrict­
ions imposed by municipal officers. They were given the right to 
hold real and personal estate, but only up to a fixed maximum 
value. It was not unusual for the utility to make contracts with 
the city, townspeople, or any other corporation withili the city 
or town for the supplying of service. In many instances because 
of favorable contracts between the utility and the city, the 
utilities were granted certain tax exemptions. The franchise 
usually provided that after a period of years the town or city 
might purchase the property of the corporation at a price deter­
mined by a commission of three uninterested persons, but the 
price was not to be below its actual cost. This statement though, 
unless there existed a close supervision over the accounts of the 
company by the municipality, did not mean much. Private corporat­
ions through the use of construction companies and other promot­
ion schemes usually showed on their books construction cost figures 
much in excess of the actual investment in the utility. The corp­
oration knowing that at some future date the municipality might 
take over the utility could, by covering up its original accounts 
and showing on its books much higher cost figures, dispose of 
its properties at a handsome profit.
The Maine Supreme Court in determining the sale price of a 
water utility based their decision on a substitute plant theory.
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nWe think the inquiry along the line of reproduction should, 
however, be limited to the replacing of the present system by 
one substantially like it. To enter upon a comparison of differ­
ent systems— to compare this one with more modern systems------
would be to open a wide door to speculative inquiry, and lead to 
discussions not germane to the subject. It is this system that is 
to be appraised, in its present condition and with its present 
efficiency.”
The rates of toll to be charged wereUeft to the discretion 
of the company. The provisions relating to capitalization were 
similiar to those franchises granted to street railroads.
Franchises granted to water companies between 1903 and
1913 offer an exception to the typical public utility franchise 
discussed above. Some seventeen franchises were granted between 
these dates and all lay down a definite rule as to the amount of 
return that a water company was to earn. The rates were to be so 
established as to provide revenue for the following purposes:
1. To pay all operating expenses of the water system.
2. To provide for the payment of the interest on the indebt­
edness of the company.
3. To provide a sum equal to not less than one half of
one per cent nor more than five per cent of the entire indebted­
ness, which sum shall be turned into a sinking fund to provide 
for the extinguishment of the indebtedness.
21. Kennebec Water District vs City of Waterville 97 Me. 185 (1902)
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Thus we find that previous to 1914 the only regulation 
that this large group of public utilities were subject to were 
such regulatory provisions as were contained in the corporate 
franchise or might be enacted by municipal ordinances, and these 
regulations only referred to the use of the streets of the city 
or the public highway. With the exception of the water districts 
no utility was regulated as to the rate it might charge. These 
utilities had been granted monopolistic priveleges, but the 
state had not as yet embarked upon a program of effective pub­
lic utility regulation.
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B. Regulation Under the Maine Public Utilities Commission
The movement that was spread-ing from state to state from 
1905 for the establishment of a strong type of Public Utilities 
commission saw the seeds for s^ch a commission in Maine sown 
in 1909, when two bills with that end in view were introduced 
into the legislative session of tha^year, one in the senate 
by Carl E. Milliken, and the other in the house by Howard 
Davies. The one by Mr. Davies proposed to change the name of the 
railroad commission to a Public Service Commission and to ex­
tend its powers over street railroads, gas plants, electrical 
plants, telephone, telegraph and express companies.^• "The 
bill was given a lengthy hearing before the Judiciary committee, 
which recommended that it be referred^to the next legislature •
A new bill creating a Public Utilities Commission was 
introduced into the house in 1911 by Mr. William R. Pattangal, 
but it was voted to refer it to the next legislature, because 
the importance of the bill warranted a more thorough consideration
In 1913 Governor Haines in his inaugural message paved 
the way for the passage of a public utilities act, when he 
recognized the necessity df establishing a more effective means 
of regulating these utilities which had had conferred upon them 
monopolistic priveleges. "We hear little complaint df disregard 
of public rights, yet we hear some; and there is a good deal of 
discussion about the subject; and a notable unrest and dissatis-
1. Legislative Record 1909 p.489
2. Oren C. Hormell, Maine Public Utilities, Bowdoin College 
Bulletin February 1927 p. 39
50
faction arising from the fact that they are not subject to a 
stricter control Ind. regulation. In all the private affairs of 
men we are accustomed, to say that it takes two to make a trade, 
but not so with the busihess of the public service companies. 
These companies ads a rule make their own prices and. formulate 
their own service and. the public can take it or leave it as 
they please on these terms and. conditions. V/hile our statute con­
templates some regulation in some cases in these matters, and the 
common law undoubtedly clothes our court with such authority, 
yet there is no easy and practical way for the average citizen 
to get at this situation; and the public seems to feel that 
such a means should be provided. I believe that the time has 
come, both in the interest of the public service companies and 
the public to be served by them, when a public service commiss­
ion should be established for this purpose.
Thus it seems that while the public utility question was 
not a burning issue to the citizenry of Maine, yet public opin- 
ion seemed to*'’viewed, the whole question in a rational manner, 
and felt that a more effective means of public utility regulation 
should be provided.
The public utilities bill as drawn up and presented to 
the 76th Legislature was substantially the Wheeler draft of the 
Wisconsin law. It was, however, amended and remodeled in some
3. Maine Acts and Resolves 1913 p. 1092
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instances so as to better meet the needs of Maine, The bill was 
passed without opposition, although Senator Hersey stated that 
plenty of opposition would, be given to stop it, for he knew that 
there was a great pressure in the lobby to defeat the bill.4. 
The bill was signed by Governor Haines March 22, 1913.
The act, however, did not take effect until November 1, 
1914 because petitions, asking that the matter be referred to a 
vote of the people, were circulated throughout the state, and 
the necessary 12,000 signatures were obtained before ninety 
days had elapsed between the signing of the act and the date 
it was to go into effect.
The bill was referred to the people at the regular state 
election in 1914 and was passed by a large majority of votes.
A survey of regulation under the Public Utilities Commiss­
ion will be discussed, undef^the following headings: (1) organiza­
tion (2) jurisdiction (3) accounts and reports (4) control over 
security issues, and (5) regulation of rates and service.
1. Organization
The Maine Public Utilities Commission is composed of 
three members who are appointed by the Governor with the advice 
and consent of the Council and hold office for seven years.
The law provides tha.t the chairman shall receive $5,000 
for salary, and the other two commissioners shall receive $4,500;
4. Bangor Daily News March 16, 1913
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the clerk is to receive $2,500 and the assistant clerk $1,500. 
The commission is authorized to to appoint a clerk, an
5
assistant clerk, an inspector of utilities, ’and "such expert, 
professional and other assistance as is necessary" for the per- 
forming of. the work of the commission. ’ The members of the comm­
ission and their staff are forbidden to have any pecuniary inter­
est in any public utility operating within the state; to hold 
any other civil office of profit or trust under the Government 
of the United States or of this state except that of justice of 
the peace and notary Public; to serve on or under any committee 
of any political party.
A comparison of the salaries of the commission and staff





chief of rates 1,700 2,750
engineers and assistants 4,953.33 5,037.76
inspectors 890.32 4,775
official reporter 679.57 2,100
assistant reporter 1,590




* clerk and assistant
Maine Acts and Resolves 1913 ch ,129 sec.l
6. ibid sec.3
7. ibid sec. 2
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An analysis of these two comparative statements shows that 
the salaries of the commission and staff have increased by about 
$15,000 in fifteen years. This increase has applied only to the 
staff of the commission. Because of the many new duties which 
have been delegated to the commission, and which are largely 
clerical in nature, it has been necessary for the commission to 
increase its personnel. The salaries paid to the commissioners, 
however, have remained unchanged during the sixteen years of 
its existence, although its commissional duties have increased 
greatly, both through new legislation and the general business 
conditions of to-day when commission supervision over public 
utilities must be more continuous.
Pro£/essor Hormell of Bowdoin, in his study of Maine 
o
Public Utilities, points out that this policy of economy as it 
is applied to the public utilities commission is extremely short­
sighted if not actually disastrous, for many young men of excell­
ent ability in the field of engineering and accounting accept 
these low salaried positions for a few years and then move on 
to accept larger salaries from utility companies and private 
industries.
When we consider that the effectiveness of regulation 
by state commissioners depends upon the ability and training of 
the commissioners, then these criticisms as pointed out are of 
vital importance both to the utilities and to the public. Not
8. Hormell, Orren Chalmer, Maine Public Utilities, p. 46
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only must a commission give continuous attention to the problems 
of the public utilities, but its decisions must be bom of a 
scientific technique and a judicial tradition
ion by a commission is to be effective, and reflect the interest 
of both the utility and the public.
2. Jurisdiction
By the Public Utility Act of 1913 the commission was vested 
with power to regulate every public utility in the state. "The 
term ’public utility’ includes every common carrier, gas company, 
electrical company, telephone company, telegraph company, whar- 
finger and warehouse man".
In 1921^0‘the jurisdiction of the commission was extended 
to include jitneys used for hire, provided that they are operated 
over regular routes between pdints in this state. The regulation 
of jitneys is of great Importance because of its competition 
with steam railroads and street and interurban railways.
In refusing to grant the application of the Maine Motor 
Goaches Inc. for permission to establish a system of motor buses 
within the state the commission believed that such a system, 
paralleling the lines of existing steam and electrical railroads 
would be of a destructive nature to the existing common carriers. 
"The objective to be sought---- is a coordination of public automob­
ile service with that of the steam railroads, and with such of
9. Maine Acts and Resolves 1913 ch.129 sec.9
10. " " " " 1921 ch.184
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the electrical railways and street railways as will lend themselves 
to such coordinate service".And again "competition which 
brings life and force and incentive to odinary industry cannot 
truthfully be said to be invariably desirable in the conduct of 
public utilities which in their nature,, although owned by individ­
uals, are dedicated to the use of all the citizens of the com*-' 
munity and governed in many ways by the state itself. Public 
utilities' must of necessity be limited in number in any given 
community in order to be at all renumerative and hence able to 
attract capital for maintenance and development. This has been 
recognized as the policy of this state since the enactment of 
the public utility law in 1914 when the state assumed to regulate 
the rate of return which such utilities may earn upon the prop­
erty devoted to the service of the public. There may be exigen­
cies when competition must be the exception to the rule, for 
industry must not wither by the slothful enterprise of those 
controlling existing utilities". •
13.
In 1923 the jurisdiction of the commission encompassed 
the operations of steamboats and motorboats engaged in inland 
navigation. The work attached to this duty is mostly clerical in 
nature, that of issuing certificates of reinstation to the owners 
of these vessels engaged in inland navigation.
11. Public Utility Reports Annotated 1926 B. 545,553
12. In re Portland Taxicab Co. (Maine) Public Utility Reports 
Annotated 1923 E. 772; in re Weiner (Maine) P.U.R. Annotated 
1925 B. 357
13. Maine Acts And Resolves 1923 ch. 149
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Under the franchise form of regulation, the municipalities 
were granted a large measure of regulatory supervision over util­
ities operating within their jurisdiction. The formation of the 
public utilities commission deprived cities and towns of much 
of their power of regulation. One of the most important en­
croachments on the regulatory power of the municipalities by the 
commission has been in regard to contracts between the municip­
ality and the utility.
The most important of these "contract” decisions rendered 
by the commission, and later upheld by the Maine Supreme Court, 
were the"Lincoln Group” of water cases.
By the terms of the franchises, water companies were allow­
ed to contract with towns, cities, and individuals for the 
supplying of services. In the public utility act, there was 
inserted a provision that all contracts were to be filed with 
the commission. An investigation of these contracts, especially 
during 1918 and 1919 when utilities were asking for increased 
rates, disclosed the fact that if the present contracts were 
to remain in effect it would lead to gross discriminations 
between those who had entered into the contract and those who 
had not contracted for the services of the utility. That is:, 
under the increased rate provisions, the non-contracting party 
would have to pay more than its fair share of the increased 
cost of operation.
In 1919 the commission rendered its decision in regard to
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contracts "between utilities and those whom it served in the 
Lincoln Water Company Case. ’ In deciding on this case the comm­
ission had to (1) define the extent of the jurisdiction of the 
public utilities commission over rates; (2) decide whether or not 
the state had divested itself of its police power by the terms 
of the franchise and (3) to determine whether or not the state 
had exempted contract rates from the operation of the public 
utilities commission.
The commission sumed up these three points in the follow­
ing arguments:
"We started with the proposition that the state has 
plenary power to regulate all quasi-municipal corporations, after, 
as well^s, before their organization, in the exercise of their 
public functions. The fixing of rates is a legislative function 
of the state. This power may be exercised by the legislature its­
elf or the legislature may delegate the power to a properly 
constituted commission, subject to judicial review. We adopted 
the' rule that contracts upon subjects which are within the pol­
ice power, even if valid, when made, must be taken to have been 
entered into in view of the continuing power of the state to 
control the rates to be charged by public service corporations 
and that the right of the state to exercise its sovereign power, 
such as the police power, cannot be altered by private contracts. 
That to subordinate the exercise of the state’s authority to the
14. In re Lincoln Water Company P.U.R. Annotated 1919 B.754
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continuing operation of previous contracts would be to place to 
this extent the regulation of rates in the hands of private indiv­
iduals and withdraw from the control of the state so much of the 
field as they might choose, by prophetic discernment, to bring 
within the range of their agreements. That if the legislature had 
no power to alter its police laws when co ntracts would be affected 
then the most important and valuable reforms might be precluded 
by the simple device of entering into contracts for that purpose. 
That the power of the state, exercised through a commission, to 
regulate rates, and in the course of such regulation to vary the 
terms of a contract obligation, for the reason that the contract, 
when entered into with the knowledge and understanding of the 
continuing authority of the state to enact laws unc^er its police 
power which might render a further performance of such contract 
unlawful”.
The Supreme Court of Maine, in sustaining the decision of 
the commission, showed that by the law of 1831, which provided 
that any charter granted after that date was subject to repeal 
or alteration by the legislature, ihe commission, as an arm of 
the legislature, has the power to alter, modify or disregardany 
and all contracts made between municipalities serving them when 
it appears that the continuance of such contracts results in an 
injustice, even though the contract may have been made previous 
15.
to the creation of the public utilities commission.
15. In re Lincoln Water Co. 118 Me. 367(1919)
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"This power of the legislature to impose uncompensated, duties, 
even burdens, upon individuals and corporations for the general 
safety is fundamental. It is the police power---- . This duty and
consequent power override all statute or contract exemption. The 
state cannot free any person or corporation from subjection to 
its power--.Its exercise must become wider, more varied and freq­
uent with the progress of society--. When the party or property 
affected, though private in its relation, the operation of the
16. 
police power is still motfe extensive and frequent".
The principle of the above decision was upheld by the 
Supreme Co urt in the case of the Town of Rockport vs Knox bounty 
Electrical Company. ’The case arose in regard to a contract 
between the town of Rockport and the Street Railway Company, by 
which contract the railway company was permitted to use the streets 
of the above named town upon condition that the company would 
keep a bridge in repair at its own expense. The commission appor­
tioned the expense of the repairs equally between the town and 
the utility company. The court held:
"That the proceedings of the municipal officers in fixing 
and determining the route and location of the railroad, and the 
acceptance by the company of the location so fixed and determined, 
did not constitute a contract for which the town may successfully 
claim immunity from legislative interference under the contract
16. B. & M. R.R. Co. vs County Commissioners 79 Lie. 386
17. 118 Me. 179 (1920)
104845 
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clause of the Constitution of the United States—• The municipal 
officers were actins as public officials exercising a governmental 
function for the safety of the public. The legislature has the 
power to confer upon the public utility commission authority to 
provide for rebuilding the bridge upon terms other than those 
imposed by the municipal officers, and thus to change the terms 
upon which the location was granted, to the municipality”.
Similiarly the commission has held that agreements between 
cities and street railroads as to the expense of constructing 
and maintaining the pavements of the streets upon which the rail­
road tracks are laid are void unless sanctioned by the commission, 
and it^Ls within the jurisdiction of the commi ssion to alocate 
such expenses as it deems expedient. "While formerly street rail­
ways were compelled by municipalities to bear a substantial por­
tion of the expense of constructing and maintaining streets, at 
the present time the current of thought has turned the other way. 
After a street is Once properly constructed, the presence of the 
car rails dauses little or no inconvenience to other users of 
the highway, and comparitively little detriment to the highway 
itself. Legislatures, courts, and commissions, therefore, have 
easily adopted the view that in the present economic era it is 
not wise to burden street railways so heavily as to compel in­
creased fares which affect all citizens and lay a heavy restrain-
18.
ing hand upon the transaction of business".
18. Maine P.U.C. Reports .Railroad Ho. 901 1923
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An attempt tb regulate the rates of a street railroad, by a 
city ordinance granting street locations, without an express 
statutory authorization, has been held to be void under the
19. 
public utility act.
While formerly the municipal officers could lay out a way 
across a railroad track, which might be absolutely useless or 
improper, the legislature in 1917 granted to the commission the 
authority to refuse to permit town ways or highways to be laid 
out across, over or under a railroad track if the terms were 
not reasonable. * Also the railroad could appeal to the public 
utilities commission from the decision of the municipal author­
ities on the question of the location of extensions, turnouts, 
and spur tracks.^’
Thus it follows that with the resumption by the State of 
Maine of the authority over the public utilities, the municipal 
officers have been shorn of their power of regulating the con­
duct of utilities within the city limits. The franchises granted 
to utilities supplying service to a municipality need no longer 
define the rights and duties of the grantee and the grantor, 
for the public utilities commission is invested with the duty 
and power to protect the public interest even at the expense 
of private interests. The municipalities have become dependent 
upon the utilities commission for the preservation of their
19. In fe Cumberland County Power and Light Company Maine
P.U.C. Reports 1918
20. Maine Acts and Resolves 1917 ch.37
21. ibid ch.35.
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rights as a corporate entity to the end. that such utilities 
as may be at their service do not wilfully disobey the orders 
of the commission, that they give continuous and adequate serv­
ice at reasonable rates#
3. Accounts and Reports
Every public utility is compelled to keep and render to 
the commission uniform accounts of all business transacted, in 
the form prescribed by the commission. The commission prescribes 
the form of all books, accounts, papers, and records that are to 
be kept^, and it is incumbent upon the utilities to comply with 
the directions of the commission in this respedt. No utility 
may use any form of accounting system other than that prescribed 
by the commission. Further control over the accounts and reports 
is secured by the provision that the commission shall audit 
the accounts of all the utilities and, "all items shall be all­
ocated to the accounts in the manner prescribed by the commiss-
22ion". * The commission has authority to require the production, 
by order or subpoena, of any books, accounts, papers or records 
of any public utility "so that an examination thereof may be 
made by the commission or under its direction".^- Thus, not 
only has the commission authority over the regulation of the 
accounts and reports of all utilities, but it has an express 
power through the use of a subpoena to command obedience to
\
its orders.
22. Maine Acts and Resolves 1913 ch.129 see. 17
23. Ibid sec.7
6 k
The commission is directed, to publish annual reports 
(since 1923 bi-annual reports have been published.), and. such 
additional reports as it deems advisable. All facts and infor­
mation in the possession of the commission are open to the 
public at all reasonable times.
The provision/ as to the publicity of accounts and reports 
is of more than passing significance, for it is founded on the 
fundamental fact that the business of a publie utility is 
affected with a public interest, and that the public should 
have a means of inquiring into the operations of these util­
ities in which they have been granted, by law, an interest.
4. Control over Securities.
The securities of public utilities which are subject to 
regulation are stocks- common and preferred, bonds and coupon 
notes and other evidences of indebtedness payable more than 
one year from the date thereof. It is generally accepted by 
State Utility Commissions that short term paper, that is, those 
payable in less than one year, are excluded from regulation. 
Securities of foreign corporations are, of course, without 
the jurisdiction of the Maine Public Utilities Commission.
No public utility may issue stocks, bonds or notes payab­
le at periods of more than twelve months unless there shall 
have been recorded upon the books of the company the order of 
the commission permitting such an increase. ‘All issues of
24. Maine Acts and Resolves 1913 ch.129 sec.36
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securities must be for lawful purposes, such as acquiring prop­
erty to be used, for carrying out its corporate powers, for con­
structing, completing, extending, or improving its facilities 
and. service, or for the lawful refunding of its obligations, or 
for other purposes as may be authorized.2®* The commission before 
issuing an order for the authorization of a security issue "shall 
make such inquiries for investigation, hold such hearings and 
examine such witnesses, books, papers, documents or contracts 
as it may deem of importance in enabling it to reachja determin- 
ation? 26 •
No public utility may decrease its capital stock or declare 
any stock, bond or scrip dividend or divide the proceeds of the 
sale of its own or any stock, bond or scrip amoung stockholders 
without the consent of the commission. ‘Public utilities are 
limitied as to the amount of the increase of capital stock. Upon 
approval of the commission the capital stock may be increased 
to an amount not exceeding $1,000,000. The public utility voting 
to increase its capital stock must file notice of the proposed
28increase with the commission within fifteen days.
To determine the advisability of permitting a public util­
ity to increase its capital stock or issue new bonds or coupon 
notes, because of its importance both to the public and the util-
25. ibid sec. 35
26. ibid
27. ibid sec 37
28. As amended 1919 ch. 115
65
ity in question, has detailed, to the commission a vast amount 
of work. In many instances it has "been necessary to make a very 
detailed study of the history and financial structure of the 
utility asking for permission to issue securities. For those 
utilities on which no previous valuation for rate making purposes 
had been made, and whose past financial history was a bit uncer­
tain, it has been necessary to make a valuation of the present 
property, and from this valuation decide whether the security 
issue could be authorized, so that over-inflation of capital­
ization would not result.
There must be a definite relation between the amount of 
stocks and bonds issued by a company. The aggregate of all sec- 
utities should not exceed the value of the property. When a 
public service corporation has no definite knowledge of the 
quantity or value of the property used in the public service, 
because no inventory has ever been taken or at least sufficient­
ly recent to be useful, then if public control over securities 
issued is to be effective, a valuation of the properties of 
the utility is required.
The commission has on several occassions been petitioned 
for permission to issue securities for purposes not enumerated 
in the Public Utility Law. In 1917 the Rumford and Bethel 
Street Railroad Company wished to issue common stock for promot­
ion service. The commission refused the request on the grounds
66.
"that it is not the policy of the Maine Commission to authorize 
the issuance of a large amount of common stock for promotion 
services in the case of a new corporation , on the theory that 
nobody can tell what such securities may prove to be worth, it 
being more desirable that promotion fees be paid in terms of 
understandable value".
Probably the most important decision of the commission 
relative to security issues is the "bond discount case".30* 
The Central Maine Power Company asked the commission to approve 
of the issuance of 7,913 shares of common capital stock of the 
company for the purpose of the lawful discharge and refunding 
of its lawful obligations incurred in providing necessary fane’s 
for the acquisition of property used for the purpose of carry­
ing out its corporate powers—, to the amount of $791,386.61 
which was the amount of unamortized discount on the several 
bond issues of the Central Maine Power Company at the date of 
the petition. The commission refused to authorize the issue 
and the case was appealed to the Maine Supreme Court which up­
held the decision of the commission. The opinion of the court 
was that "it is perfectly legitimate for a utility to sell its 
bonds at less than their face value. Indeed experience has prov­
en that a saving in interest is effected by so doing and that 
such bonds are easily marketable. But if a $1,000 bond which 
could be sold at par provided it bore interest at six percent
29. Public Utility Reports Annonated 1917 B. 898
30.In re Central Maine Power,Company.PublicUtility Reports
Annotated 1930 B.l
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sells for $900 when paying five per cent, it is apparent that 
the obligor pays for the use ^f the $900 which it receives, not 
only $50 during the life of the bond, but $100 additional at its 
maturity. Bond discount is,therefore, only another term for 
deferred interest—-. It could not be seriously argued that int­
erest should be paid out of capital. It must be paid out of earn­
ings and any attempt to capitalize a deferred interest charge 
or a note given to cover such a charge is an attempt to capital­
'llize future earnings7
The commission exercises close supervision and control over 
securitiesn Issuance is allowed only upon authorization of the 
commission, based upon a statement of the amount and character 
of the issue desired and its purpose. Under this method the 
financial structure of the utility is studied, a time and place 
is set for a hearing, and the application investigated. If the 
issue is authorized, it fixes the amount of the issue and speci­
fies the purposes for which the funds realized from the sale 
thereof: may be used. This strict superversion of the securities 
is an important aspect of regulation both to the utility and the 
public, for the utility is under a recurrent necessity of attract­
ing new investments from the investing public, and the public, 
if it is confident that new Issues of securities are authorized 
only upon the best judgement of the commission, may Eagerly take 
up the new issue.
31. In re Central Maine Bower Co. 130 Maine 28,35. ( )
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5. Rates and Service.
The aim of public utility regulation is to secure adequate 
and continuous service at reasonable rates. Thus it becomes 
incumbent upon the commission to see that the rates, tolls, or 
charges of the utility granting service to the public "Shall be 
reasonable and just, taking into consideration the fair value 
of all its property with a fair return thereon, its rights and 
plant as a going concern, business risk and depreciation. 
Every unjust or unreasonable charge for such service is hereby 
prohibited and declared unlawful".
The Public Utility law of the State of Maine grants to the 
commission authority to inquire into the rates exacted by any 
utility doing business within the state, either upon its own 
initiative, or upon complaint of ^bused^ persons. The commission 
is authorized to ^’sumarilly/investigate, with of without notiee, 
upon its own initiative the^ustice of any rate or charge". The 
commission is obliged to investigate the rates charged by any 
utility when "ten persons, firms or corporations or associations, 
aggrieved" make a written complaint against the practice of the 
utility or when the utility itself makes a complaint as to any
33 • * matter affecting its own product, service or charges. \
Immediately upon the filing of a complaint the commission 
must notify the utility of the complaint anqthe nature of the 
complaint against it. If after ten days the cause of the complaint
32. Maine Acts and Resolves 1913 ch.129 sec.10
33. Ibid sec. 41 and 46.
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is not removed then the commission shall set a time and place
34 •for a formal hearing. No orders, however, affecting the 
practices of the utility complained against shall be entered 
by the commission without a formal hearing.
If the commission finds that the rates, tolls, schedules, 
or charges complained against are discriminatory then the commiss- 
has power to order a new schedule of rates, tolls, or charges, 
substituted as shall be reasonable. * Likewise it is provided 
that if upon a formal hearing it is found that the service com­
plained against is unjust, inadequate, discriminatory, or that 
reasonable service cannot be obtained then the commission has 
power to establish and substitute such service as shall be 
just and reasonable. •
Exceptions to the decision of the commission may be made 
only in question, but while questions of law are pending, how­
ever, the orders of the commission shall remain in force, and 
no injunction shall be issued suspending or staying the orders 
of the commission while such questions of law are being decided
37.
upon.
It is made unlawful for any public utility to charge one 
person or corporation more for a given service than it charges 
another person for a like service; or to give undue preference to 






to undue prejudice, in any respect however* Moreover it is made 
unlawful for any person or corporation knowlingly to solicit or 
accept a rebate, concession or discrimination in respect to 
public utility service within the state. But nothing in the act 
is to be construed to prohibit a utility from entering into a 
reasonable agreement with its customers regarding rates and 
service; but before any such arrangements are made lawful it 
must be approved by the commission.
Decisions and orders of the commission in regard to the 
services performed by the utilities have been more numerous 
than those that have arisen in regard to rates and the issuance 
of securities. Yet the commission has followed no general prin­
ciples in deciding on these complaints for service. Rather, each 
case has been decided upon its own merits. When a complaint is 
made to the commission regarding the service that is being rend­
ered by a utility, the commission attempts through informal hear­
ings to bring the public and the utility together to reach an 
agreement or compromise without resorting to a formal decree. 
During the first year of its existence, the commission stated 
that they haft arranged satisfactorily "more than ninty percent 
of all complaints without the necessity of a hearing”.®8*
Complaints regarding rates are not so easily disposed, and 
they will be considered below under valuation.
In addition to those duties which look to rates, service, 
and the financial structure of the utility, which become the
38. Maine Public Utility Commission Reports 1915 p. 11 
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main function of a public utilities commission, the Maine Commiss­
ion has had imposed upon it additional duties which are only 
incidentally related to the main function of regulation and 
control. These commissional duties retain a hang-over from the 
duties of the old railroad commission by the requirement that 
it inspect railroads, their rolling stock, roads, and bridges. 
The commission is authorized to order repairs of its rolling 
stock, bridges and roads when in its opinion public safety so 
demands it. This work commands the major portion of the time of 
the chief inspector, who is required by law to be an experienced 
railroad man. In addition, the commission is authorized to in­
vestigate into grade crossings and to decide what should be 
done concerning the abolition of such crossings when public 
safety so demands. The erection of stations, the erection of 
gates at crossings, and the regulation of fenders and headlights 
on street cars are also duties of the commission which were once 
those of the board of railroad commissioners.
The inspection department of the commissioji must investig­
ate all accidents of serious nature upon the premises of any 
public utility and make a report to the commission. These invest­
igations are for the purpose of making recommendations so as to 
prevent the recurrence of similiar accidents•
By the public utility act of 1913 the commission was also 
invested with the powers and duties of the Maine Water Power 
Commission. This duty, in itself, places an unlimited amount
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of work on the hands of the commission for it is provided, that 
"the commission shall collect information relating to the water 
powers of the state, the flow of rivers, and their drainage 
area, the location, nature and size of the lakes and ponds in 
the state and their respective value and capacity as storage 
reservoirs, and such other hydrographic data as they may deem 
of value in devising the best methods for the improvement of 
the natural storage basins of the state, and the creation of 
new storage reservoirs, with a view of conserving the capacity
39 •of the water powers of the state” •
The "Water Pollution Act” of 1917, charged the commission 
with the important duty of supervising water companies to the 
extent of preventing the sources of all domestic supplies from 
being polluted. This work is carried on in cooperation with the
40.State department of Health.
In 1925 the legislature added to the already long list of 
duties of the commission the duty of regulating advertising 
signs upon public highways. This act refers to any advertising 
device so situated as to obstruct clear vision on intersecting 
highways or in any way prevent the safe use of the public high­
ways. The act does not apply to those signs "erected or main­
tained with the approval of the State Highway Commission, sole­
ly for the purpose of safeguarding, facilitating or protecting
39. As amended 1925 ch.187
40. Maine Acts and Resolves 1917 ch.98
41. Maine Acts and Resolves 1925 ch. 188
Tb.
Valuation for Rate Making Purposes Under the
J
Maine Public Utilities Commission.
The law that create^he Public Utilities Commission of
Maine conferred upon the commission the power to "fix a reason­
able value upon all property of any publiv utility usedor requir­
ed to be used in its service to the public within the state when­
ever it deems a valuation thereof to be necessary for the fix­
ing of fair and reasonable rates, tolls and charges".The 
law, however, was silent as to the "proper treatment and prin­
ciples applicable to valuation"2*, and such principles and meth­
ods, relating to valuation, as might be employed were left to 
the discretion of the commission.
In their first annual report, the commission stated that 
due to the chaotic condition of affairs, they refrained from 
attempting on their own motion, any valuation of the properties 
of public utilities. They pointed out that due to the financial 
resources available a general valuation would be prohibitive. 
The valuation of electrival utilities alone, they claimed, would 
so exhaust their resources as to leave them with no money to
3.perform any other services.
Before the end of 1916, many of the larger utilities in the 
state, after conferences with the commission, began complete 
valuation work on their propertiesThe commission itself,
1. Maine Acts and Resolves 1913 ch 128 see.34
2. Maine P.U.C. Reports 1915 p. 39
3. ibid
4. These companies were the Cumberland County Power and Light, 
the Bangor Railway and Electric, and the Lewiston Gas Light.
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because of complaints against rates or practices, entered upon 
independent valuation work for several utilities, amoung them 
being the St. Croix Gas Light Company, the Biddeford and Saco 
Water Company, and the Peaks Island Corporation. The commission 
announced that in order to make their service to the public more 
general and to assist the smaller companies, they were making 
valuations of one or more companies in each county so as to 
obtain a more accurate working knowledge of local conditions in 
each community, and thus bring the department into more intim­
ate relation with each local public.
We have seen that there are in vogue two accepted methods 
of determining the rate base upon which a public utility is 
allowed by law to earn a reasonable return; first, the histor­
ical cost basis which looks to the original cost of construct­
ing the utility’s property, or that sum of money prudently in­
vested in the properties; and secondly, that method which attempts 
to determine the present fair value of the properties of the 
utility used and useful in the service of the public by reprod­
ucing these propeties at prevailing prices of land, labor, and 
materials•
In the absence of any controlling statutory provision, or 
precedent, in the st&toe as to what shall be the measure of "fair 
value”, the commission left with the use of its own discretion 
in the matter, would probally be influenced by those decisions 
rendered by the United States Supreme Court, and public service
5. Maine P.U.C. Reports 1916 p.7
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commissions of other states, as to what seems to be the approved 
basis upon which a rate base is to be determined. The most import­
ant United States Supreme Court decisions, during the life of 
the Maine Commission, have enunciated the rule that the measure 
of "fair value" is the reproduction cost basis based on prices 
obtaining as 6f the time the inquiry is to be made.
In our analysis of the policy of the Maire Public Utilities 
Commission in regard to valuation for rate amking purposes,we 
will attempt to reach two conclusions; (1) what has been the 
measure of fair value employed by the commission. That is, has 
the commission utilized Reproduction cost basis, actual cost 
basis, or some form of prudent investment in their valuation 
work, and (B) has the commission been consistent in the use 
of any, one measure of fair value.
In order to show what method or methods the Maine Public 
Utilities Commission has employed in measuring "fair value" 
for rate making purposes, we are including a resume of nine 
cases rendered by the commission which we feel are representat­
ive of the findings of the commission. It is not to be inferred, 
however that such final conclusions as we may reach with refer­
ence to valuation for rate making purposes in Maine are based 
solely upon the evidence presented in these cases.
In the Lewiston, Augusta, and Waterville Street Railway
g
Company * decision of 1916, the commission believed that the
6. Maine P.U.C. Reports 1916 
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original cost of a utility, constructed, within a reasonable 
time under normal conditions, when satisfactorily obtainable id 
preferable in rate cases to cost new, or cost of reproduction 
less depreciation, in fixing present value. "This (original 
cost) is now recognized as the modern doctrine for the reason 
that if the books of a public utility were properly and accurately 
kept when construction was begun, having been properly and 
accurately kept since, and all or practically all vouchers have 
been retained?, the true value of the property upon any given date 
can be ascertained with substantial accuracy;— We therefore 
find that the original or actual cost is the approved method—".
In the St'. Croix Gas Light Case of 1918, ’the commission 
employed the reproduction cost less depreciation method, based
<
on a five year average of unit prices as of 1915, for fixing 
the rate b«se upon which the company was to earn a fair return. 
The commission thus affected a change in policy in the method 
employed in determining fair value. In the previous case they 
stated that original cost was the approved method, yet in this 
instance they have used reproduction cost less depreciation as the 
measure of fair value. As was shown above, the St. Croix Gas 
Light Company was One of the first utilities upon which the 
commission had undertaken valuation work.
In the St. Croix case the commission refused to allow an 
item for going value, ruling that "an allowance for going value, 
*7. Maine P.U.C. Reports 1918
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in rate cases, is the capitalization of that sum of money by 
which the business has failed, to earn a fair return on the 
investment. No allowance will be made where this condition does 
not exist". This, in general, has been the rule followed by 
the commission in determining going value.
8 •
Looking to the Portland Gas Light ^ase of 1918 , we find
that the commission has employed a hybrid of reproduction cost 
and actual eost in determining the present fair value of this 
company. The valuation of the company was made as of Oct.l, 1915, 
by C. H. Teeny and Company. The valuation was made on the basis 
of reproduction cost new. The commission accepted the figures as 
found by the experts, and after making allowances for certain 
overhead charges, added the net cost of additions to the prop­
erty since 1915, and then deducted the accrued depreciation. 
The results obtained was considered the present fair value of 
the utility.
Similarily this procedure was followed by the commission
9 
in the second Biddeford and Saco Water Company fcase.’ In a 
previous case^’the commission fixed the rate base of this same 
company at $1,030,620, which was based on reproduction cost 
less depreciation, the unit items of property being based on a 
five year average as of Aug. 21, 1915. In the second case the 
commission decided that the valuation found as of 1915, used 
in the first case, should stand. Net additions to the property
8. Maine P.U.C. Reports 1919
9. Maine P.U.C. Reports 1920 ,
10. Percy R. Rich et al vs Biddeford and Saco Water Company,
Maine P.U.C. Reports 1918
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from 1915 to 1919 were added, and the accrued depreciation de­
ducted. ”A valuation made as of a certain date can be kept up 
to any other date very easily, for the reason that under the 
accounting methods applied by this commission all capitalizable 
additions to property appear upon the books of the company with 
the exact cost thereof, and i^is a simple matter to build up to 
any particular date, by the process of addition and depreciat­
ion, the value of the existing property at that particular date”
In twojcases, in 1921, the commission considers the use of 
prudent investment as the measure of fair value. In re York
11.
County Water Company it was stated that the reproduction less 
depreciation figure, based on a five year average, was nearly 
the same as the prudent investment figure. However, the commiss­
ion felt that it was not ready to change absolutely from the 
reproduction less depreciation basis, and in this particular 
case reproduction cost basis would be employed. It was not stated 
what years were included in the five year average, but the rate 
base of $780,373 is somewhat in excess of the rate base of $659,
12.
708, fixed in 1918, which was based on a ten year average of 
actual cost figures. It is presumed that some weight must have 
been given to prices in existence at the time of the inquiry.
In the same year, 1921, it is noted that the commission 
refused to reproduce the properties of the Lewiston Gas Light
11. Public Utility Reports Annotated 1921 A. 439
12. In re York County Water Co. ,Maine P.U.C. Reports 1918
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13.Company at prices in effect as of Oct. 1, 1920, or on a five 
year average ending Oot.l, 1920, for they considered the reprod- 
uction cost method as never entirely satisfactorily, and due to 
the period of exceedingly high prices it was proving even more 
unsatisfactorily. The capitalization of the company was as follows 




The fair value of the property was stated to be "not less 
than $650,000. The fair value of this company seems to have been 
based entirely on its capitalization. There is no evidence to 
show that any other method was considered, unless it was prud­
ent investment.
14 •
The Castine Water Company in 1923 adopted the reproduction 
less depreciation figure found by the commission for its rate 
base. It was stated that, "the reproduction cost less depreciat­
ion on basis of present prices would be much in excess of this 
figure"•
In checking over the valuation figures of the properties
15.of the New England Telephone and Telegraph Company in Maine, 
presented by the chief engineer of the company who made the 
valuation on the basis of reproduction cost, the commission 
refused to allow an item for pavements over mains. The policy 
of the commission does not seem to have been to allow the utility 
to reproduce their properties at present prices and under pres­
ent conditions, otherwise this item would have been allowed.
13. Public Utility Reports Annotated 1921 A. 561
14. Maine P.U.C. Reports 1923-24
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16In re Camden and. Rockland. Water Company, 1929, it was 
stated, that, "Reproduction cost and. reproduction cost less deprec­
iation are important elements to be considered, along with other 
evidence introduced in the case, in determining fair value" • 
The property was appraised as of December 31, 1928, the results 
being composed of the various itemized accounts as of January 
1, 1928 plus all net additions to the plant during 1928, The 
book-fixed capital was in excess of any appraisals made, and 
the rate base as fixed by the commission. The rates were increas­
ed to provide a 6.3 percent return on the rate base. Why this 
particular rate of return was chosen we do notlcnow, but the 
commission must have felt that this would yield a fair return 
on its capital stock. This case has not been decided on the 
merits of any one single basis. Consideration has been given to 
reproduction cost, actual cost, and the capitalization of the 
company.
The Commission, in its second report, 1916, announced its 
policy .with regard to determining the rate base, or fair value 
when it stated that valuations were being made of several of the 
larger utilities in the state, and that "when these companies, 
and this commission shall have on their files this complete, 
accurate, and up to date information, the matter of keeping it 
up to the minute each year will, under present methods of account­
ing be comparatively simple---- • We shall then all know the exact
ratio of the return in the fotbl of rates, to the fair value of
15. Public Utility Reports Annotated 1926 B. 247
16. Public Utility Reports Annotated 1929 E. 325
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the property devoted, to the public service, and. the amount to
17.
be charged, to produce that return”.
In the Lewiston, Augusta and Waterville Railroad Company 
decision, which is summarized above, the commission held that, 
"the original cost method is the approved method in fixing 
present values (fair value) of the property for the purposes 
of rate making; and, the original cost of a utility, construct­
ed within a reasonable time under normal conditions, when satis­
factorily obtainable, is preferable in rate cases to cost new, 
or cost of reproduction less depreciation, in fixing rates" •
The determination of the present value of the property 
now used in the service of the public, as interpreted by the 
commission, means the original cost of construction plus cost 
of additions that are proper capital charges under approved 
accounting methods.
The intent of the commission seems to have been to devise 
some standardized form of rate base which could be brought up 
to date by the simple process of addition and depreciation. 
Professor Hormell points out that this, "result might have mater­
ialized.had the commission been able to carry out its plan of 
physical valuation or had it been able or seen fit to follow 
the ’prudent investment or original cost’ theory in arriving
, « , _ 18 •at fair value"•
It was stated in the Peaks Island Corporation decision of
17. Maine P.U.C. Reports 1916 p.8
18. Hormell, Maine Public Utilities p.57
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19.
1917 that the valuation of this utility was made on the basis 
of reproduction cost less depreciation, for the data available 
was too meagre to determine its original cost. The decisions 
rendered by the commission from 1917 to 1920 show that reproduct­
ion cost basis has replaced actual cost basis as the factor to 
be given the greater weight in determining fair value, ifet it 
can be seen that the commission still holds to the theory that 
a valuation made as of a certain date can be brought up to the 
minute under accounting methods. This method of determining 
present fair value is clearly shown in the Portland Gas Light, 
and the second Biddeford and Saco Water Company decisions, 
included above, and is substantiated by other decisions rendered 
by the commission down to 1920. These original valuations which 
were based on reproduction cost were, in the main, measured 
over a period of years which the commission felt represented a 
normal cost average rather than on prices obtaining as of the 
time of the inquiry. Thus in the Bar Harbor and Union River 
Power Company ease ‘the valuation of the company’s properties 
was made by the company on the basis of reproduction cost with 
unit prices measured over a five year period as of 1916. The 
commission used the five year period ending in 1917, for the 
reason that they had used that average in nearly all their val­
uation work, and believed this five year average more represen­
tative than the five year average ending in 1916.
19. George H. Briggs et al vs Peaks Island Corporation. Public 
Utility Reports Annotated 1917 E. 750
20. Public Utility Reports Annotated 1921 I). 298
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The rfprod.netion cost hypothesis was pushed to the front 
in valuation cases due to the great upheavel in prices occasioned
21by the World War. * The most telling argument for the reproduct­
ion cost basis, either as the sole standard or as an important 
element in fair value, that has been advanced is the deprivation 
of the utility’s right of a fair return on a fair value, due to 
the fall in the purchasing power of the return during a period 
of abnormally high prices. The rate base must be fixed at a high 
enough level to compensate the common stockholders for this fall 
in the purchasing power of the return ooasioned by increased 
costs of materials, land and labor. "In all the vast amount of 
discussion favoring the reproduction cost basis of valuation, 
there has never been a proposal suggesting even remotely that 
any adjustment should be made in the return allowed to bond­
holders. The argument has proceeded throughout from the stand­
point of making the higher valuation on all the properties 
employed in the public service, whether the funds were provided 
through the issue of securities cwith a fixed return or through 
the issue of common stock, Such an adjustment, it is clear, 
would result in giving the entire benefit of the increase on the 
entire investment to the common stockholders and none to the
22 •
others who had furnished the bulk of the moneys" •
The commission, in several instances has stated that the 
outstanding securities of a utility throw no light on its fair 
value, and is given no consideration in the fixing of a rate
21. See chart opposite page 27
22. Bauer, Effective Regulation of Public Utilities. Page 125 
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base. While this may be true in some instances, it does not hold 
true for all cases. Let us consider what is meant by a fair 
return on a fair value. Out of this fair return that is earned, 
the utility pays its interest to bondholders and dividends to 
stockholders respectively. The amount necessary to pay the int­
erest on bonds is fixed and readily ascertainable,but the return 
to the stockholders is not a_fixed amount, except in the case 
of preferred stock, and depends upon the relative risk of the 
capital invested in a particular utility. public utility must, 
from time to time, attract new capital to the enterprise, but 
if the return to the investor is not sufficiently large enough 
to compensate him for the risk to the investment, then the prob­
lem of securing additional capital becomes acute to the utility. 
In addition to the amount necessary to pay interest and dividends 
the utility should be provided a sum to build up a surplus and 
thus buttress and strengthen its credit. It may be only a 
coincidence that the capitalization (based on the par value of 
the securities) as shown on the books of the company, and the 
fair value as found, in many instances were nearly identical.
And a valuation used as a basis of security issue has been deemed
23. not inappropriate to use as a base upon which to fix rates.
In their report for 1920, the commission points out many 
fallacies encountered in the use of the reproduction cost basis. 
The use of reproduction cost, they pointed out, by engineers in 
23. In re Penobscot County Water Company 1924 (Stenographic Copy) 
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the early days of regulation was based on prices at which 
material and labor could be obtained to reproduce a plant over 
a five or ten year period immediately prior to the time when 
a valuation; was being attempted. But in a period of mounting 
costs which followed the beginning of the war it was seen that 
to include any of the war years in the five year average, would 
result in an exaggerated figure. As seen, the commission in the 
Lewiston Gas Light decision refused to employ either present 
prices or a five year average as of 1920 as a basis upon which 
to determine present fair value. One of the big objections to 
the use of reproduction cost as a standard of fair value is 
the flexibleness of the rate base. Each time a new complaint 
regarding rates comes before the commission it necessitates a 
re-valuation of the utility based on present prices which 
might or might not be representative.
"If we should undertake to fix as a present fair value of 
the company’s property the amount obtained by applying present 
prices, in three or five years from now, these prices might drop 
to the pre-war level, and would the amount obtained in 1920 be 
the fair value of the property in 1923, 1924, or 1925, or 
would we again have to make a valuation and apply prices obtain-
24 •ing at the time of the new valuation”?
24. In re Lewiston Gas Light Co.,P. U. R. Annotated 1921 A. 561.
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Although the York County Water Company was given the benefit 
of some years of high prices, the policy of the commission since 
1920 has not been to base reproduction cost upon present prices 
and under present conditions. In the Penobscot Case of 1924,25
26 
and in the Milo Water Company Case of 1928, the commission deter­
mined present value by using a valuation previously made, and to 
this base as found added all net additions since made to the 
property. This method of determining present fair value is, what 
we have previously termed, a hybrid of reproduction costs basis 
and actual costs basis.
The commission on several occasions has favored the employ­
ment of prudent investment as a measure of fair value. What 
statements the commission has made in reference to prudent invest­
ments have been more in the nature of dicta, rather than in the 
practical application of this theory.
The first commission reports seemed to bring out the fact 
that the commission was rather optimistic in developing a policy 
based upon some form of prudent investment• In 1920 they still 
favored this method because of the difficulties encountered in the 
use of the reproduction cost ba,sis. "Engineers, commissions, and 
courts have been seeking a better method of valuation, and all these 
agencies hrernow very seriously considering the ascertainment of 
an Investment cost and using that as a foundation and perhaps a
25. Penpbscot County Water Co(stenographic copy)
26. P. U. R. Annotated 1928E 650
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principle part of that which enters into value”.• In the 
Lewiston Gas Light case the commission again pointed out that 
”the actual investment made by the company from the beginning 
is thought to be worthy of very serious consideration in arriv­
ing at a fair value”.28* And again, in the York County Water 
case the commission stated that the reproduction cost figure and 
the prudent investment figure were nearly the same, but "inas­
much as this commission is not entirely ready to change absolut­
ely from the reproduction less depreciation theory, we shall in
29 • this particular case adhere to the reproduction cost theory"•
During the last few years the commission has not talked 
of prudent investment. They have probably been influenced by 
the United States Supreme Court which has continued to hold 
for reproduction cost basis as the measure of fair value.
Prudent investment, however, has much to be said in its 
favor. What the promulgators of the prudent investment theory 
seek is a fixed and definite rate base uninfluenced by changes 
in the price level. Under this theory the dependent variable 
will be the rate of return which will vary inversely as the 
value of the dollar varies, or as the purchasing power of the 
return varies. Under the reproduction cost hypothesis the var­
iable factor is the rate base which moves up or down in direct 
relationship with the general price level. This may be more 
clearly explained by the use of an example.
27. Maine P.U.C. Reports 1920 page 13
28. P.U.R. Annotated 1921 A. 571
29. Ibid page 442 (in re York County Water Company)
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Let us suppose that a new company has Just been established 
at a cost of one hundred thousand dollars. This figure would 
represent both the original cost andthe reproduction cost of 
the business, and this problem weshall assume that this figure 
is a fair value of the property used and useful in the public 
service.
The capitalization is as follows:
Bonds 5£











It is decided that the company is entitled to earn a seven
percent return on its fair value. The fair return out of which 
to pay interest to bondholders and dividends to stockholders 
is $7,000. Deducting $4,200, the fixed charges, from this 
amount the net income available for common stock is $2,800, * S
which represents a 14 percent return on $20,000 of common stock.
The return on common stock varies with the ratio between the 
outstanding stocks and bonds. Thus if the capitalization were as 
follows:
Bonds 5^ $50,000 $2,500
Common stock 50,000
Then deducting $2,500, the fixed charges, from the fair return 
of $7,000, would leave $4,500 for the common stockholders, or 
a 9 percent return on $50,000 of capital stock. While both the 
♦For our purposes, we have eliminated the factor of a sinking fun€« 
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public utility commission, and the courts maintain that the 
capitalization of a utility is not given consideration in val­
uation for rate making purposes, ii^.s seen that the ratio between 
bonded indebtedness and capital stock does influence the fair 
return to be allowed, for the return in the form of dividends 
must be sufficient to compensate the stockholders for the risk 
incurred in thlir investment, and to attract additional capital 
into the enterprise.
Let us suppose further that we are in a period of rising 
price levels when interest rates have increased, and the purchas­
ing power of the dollar has diminished. The company complains 
that the rate of return that it now receives is confiscatory, 
and that its fair value should be in excess of $100,000.
Now we may do either of two things—increase the rate base 
or increase the rate of return so as to allow the company a 
fair return sufficient to counteract the increase in interest 
and the depreciated purchasing power of its dollar.
By using the reproduction cost basis we may suppose that 
the present fair value of this companyis $130,000. A 7 percent 
return on this amount would yield a fair return of $9,100. 
Deducting the fixed charges of the amount of $4,200, found in 
the first capitalization schedule, the amount available for 
common stock would be $4,900, or a return of approximately 24 
percent on $20,000 Of common stock. Using the second capitali­
zation schedule shown above, the amount available for common 
90.
stock would, be $6,600($9,100-2,5000 or a return of about 14 per­
cent on $50,000 Of common stock.
By using the prudent investment Method we may arrive at the 
same result, viz. an increase in the fair return to $9,000, by 
merely increasing the rate of return from 7 percent to 9 percent 
and. leaving the rate base unchanged.. By increasing the rate of 
return instead, of the rate base we eliminate costly evaluation 
and. more costly litigation that usually follows the utilization of 
the reproduction cost method of determining what shall be the 
rate base of a utility upon which it is to earn a fair return.
In the former instance we have made valuation work an accounts 
ing proposition, while in the latter case we have made the 
whole field of valuation one of engineering economics permeated 
with expert op onion, ^conjectures, andMignif led guesses. *
When we increase the rate base of a public utility 25 or
50 percent hardly a ripple may occur on the wave of public 
oponion, but if we were to increase the rate of return from 7 
to 9 or 10 percent, probably the commission who granted this in­
creased rate ofreturn would be subject to no end of criticism
SO. "This method of determining value (cost of reproduction 
less depreciation) usually included percentages for engineering 
service never rendered, hypothetical efficiency of unknown labor, 
conjectural depreciation, oponion as to the condition of prop­
erty, the supposed action of the owners, and of course, its 
correctness depends upon whether superintendence was or would be 
wise or foolish; the investment inprovident or frugal. It is 
bases upon prophecy instead of reality, and depends so much 
upon half-truths that it bears only a remote resemblance to facts, 
and rises at best, only to the plain of the digrified guess". 
Michigan Public Utilities Commission, in re Michigan State Tele­
phone Company,?. U. R. Annotated 1921 C545, 554-555.
91
by a public which is used to speaking in terms of five, six, 
or seven percent. Yet both methods lead to the same result, 
a factor which the public and the utilities must be educated to, 
if the prudent investment theory is ever to rise beyond being 
"just a theory" and have practical application in public utility 
economics in the future.
The situation in Maine seems to be that the commission 
favors one theory and uses another. But just what theory they 
do employ is hard to say. At least they have not been consistant 
in the use of any one measure of fair value. In their report 
for 1922 we find this statment:
"In the past^valuation work has been undertaken only in 
connection with some partictLlar case and in these circumstances 
the results may at times be colored to a greater or less extent 
by the purposes for which the valuation is being made. It is my 
belief that a systematic valuation of all the public utilities 
properties in the state should be started. Such a process would 
result in putting all of the properties on the bases and would 
eliminate the chance of the results being influenced by the 
circumstances of a particular case —, and that such valuations 
made on an established basis could readily be changed to any 
other basis deemed necessary in a particular case by direct com- 
parison of the bases involved". *
31. Maine P. U. C. Reports 1922 page 14(statement of William 
Black, Chief Engineer)
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The commission has in mind, a definite policy for valuation. 
They look to the development of a standardized rate basis which 
will remove from valuation work all discrepancies, dignified 
guesses, conjectures, etc. which have permeated the field of 
valuation in the past. Yet the realization of this policy or 
goal seems impossible of attainment both because no one measure 
of fair value has ever been recognized by both the state commissions 
and\^he courts as >he sole standard of determining fair value, 
and because the commission never has, anc^srobably never will have 
sufficient financial resources to carry out such a program.
The conclusions arrived at in these cases on valuation 
renedered by the Maine Commission, have been, as a rule, the 
results of haphazard methods based on no well established prin­
ciple or theory. While the great majority of these decisions 
state that reproduction cost basis less depreciation has Been used, 
we find no evidence that reproduction cost has ever been based 
solely on present prices or prices obtained as of the time the 
inquiry was made. It would be more appropriate to call it an 
"average method". Nor have the finding^of the commission been 
based wholly on an average reproduction cost of the physical 
properties of the utility. In many instances they contain a 
hybrid of reproduction cost and actual cost,and have been colored
• to a considerable extent by the capitalization of the utility, 
the criminal cost when ascertainable, and^the rates to be charged 
to produce treasonable return.
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Thus It appears that the Maine Commission has not adhered 
rigidly or consistently to any one method of determining fair 
value•
The failure of the Maine Commission to develope a consist­
ent policy is not a situation unique to regulation by state comm­
issions. A recent study of the "Massachussetts Plan" by Irston
32.
Barnes reveals that this state which has long been looked 
upon as a follower of the prudent investment theory, has been 
neither consistent nor rigid in the application of this theory. 
The Maine Commission is undermanaged and under pa id. Changes in 
its personnel have been frequent. New commissioners bring with 
them new ideas, so that the development of a consistent policy 
on these grounds alone would be almost impossible of accomplish­
ment •
The commission combines the functions of a couht and a leg­
islature. Its close resemblance to a court is well displayed by 
the provision that there can be no appeal from the findings of 
the commission to any court so far as questions of fact are con­
cerned, only questions of law may be appealed. Several decisions 
rendered by the commission have been appealed to the Maine Supr­
eme Court, but so far as we have been able to discover no commiss­
ion decision has ever been reviewed on the grounds that the commiss 
ion policy with reference to valuation for rate making purposes 
has led to confiscation of the property of the utility, or has
32. Barnes, Irston R., Public Utility Control in Massachussetts,
Yale University Press 1930
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resulted in the granting of rates which have been exorbitant 
and unreasonable from the standpoint of the consumer. Criticism 
has been directed toward the evidence, relating to fact that the 
commission has introduced or excluded in particular cases. 
Noteworthy is the Penobscot County Water case decided in 1924. 
Two petitions by the water company were heard concurrently.
One asked that authority be granted by the petitioner to consol­
idate and combine all of the petitioner’s water works serving the 
cities of Oldtown and Brewer and the towns of Milford, Orono, 
and Veazie, into a single system; the other petition was for an 
increase in rates.
The question of valuation was contested throughout the hear­
ings. W. R. Pattangall, who represented the towns of Orono and 
Veazie, in his summary of the case claimed that the fair value of 
the properties as found by the commission was in excess of its 
true value, andtfeontended that the sum paid to the former owner 
by the petitioner should be considered by the commissioner as an 
important, if not controlling factor in fixingjthe present fair 
value of the properties for a rate base. "We were not permitted 
to show the price for which this properties purchased in 1922z 
but the commission Imows the price; we know the price; the com-
33 plaining company knows the price”. In the decision of the 
commissioh we find this statment;"Although the remonstrants 
were not permitted to offer evidence in the form presented as
33. Summary of Argument presented by W. R. Pattangall in
Penobscot County Water Company vs. Itself page 12.
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to the sum paid, for the property by the present owner, it is 
nevertheless, in the record, that the amount so paid was known 
to the commission, and. the commission accorded an opportunity 
to all parties to present evidence of what the fair value of the 
property was on which rates might lawfully be based. The remon-
34strantsj however, offered no such evidence". * An increase in 
rates was granted by the commission.
The rules of procedure in the hearing of complaints are 
similiar to those of a court. The law provides that,"all 
processes shall be served and the practices and rules of evidence 
shall be the same as in civil action in the supreme judicial 
court"• * The commission may order the appearance of witnesses
at a hearing and, "each witness---- shall receive for his atten­
dance the fee and mileage provided for witnesses in a civil 
case in the supreme judicial court". ’ Any failure to comply 
with the orders of the commission is declared to be "contempt 
of the commission", and is punishable, "and in the same manner 
and to the same extent as contempt is punished by courts of
37-record"•
Looking to the legislative function of the commission we 
find that such investigations as the commission makes on its 
own motion may be divided into two classes—those of general 
public interest, and those where less than ten persons have, or 
may have, a real grievance, but are unable through lack of numbers
34. In re Penobscot County Water Co. (stenographic copy page 5
35. Maine Acts and Resolves 1913 ch.129 sec.57
36. Ibid sec.50
37. Ibid sec. 53
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to institute formal complaint themselves. .
The effectivness of public utility control andregulation 
cannot be measured alone by its judicial function, which gives to 
the commission a weapon by which it may compel obedience to its 
orders, without taking into consideration its legislative function, 
which requires that all public utilities be investigated in the 
interest of the public. But when the judicial function of a 
public service commii&ion outweigh its legislative functions, 
then public interest may be sacfificed in favor of private interests
The task of regulation is a very difficult one. Regulation 
by state commissioners, to be effective, must be placed in the 
hands of commissioners who have marked ability, unimpeachable 
integrity, and who are, at all times, imbued with high ideals 
of public service., As we have pointed out before, changes in the 
personnel of the Maine Public Utilities Commission have been
Men who receive trainring in the interpretation of the 
public utility law, and the method adopted by the commission 
in treating with certain problems, soon pass on to accept higher 
salaried positions with the utilities companies, an<? thus give 
to them the benefit of their previous training.
The tendency has been to extend, rather than to restrPet 
the jurisdiction and powers of the Maine Commission. Working 
under limited appropriations, and with a limited personnel,the 
commission has been forced to treat with matters not germane 
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to the main functions of public utility control, so that it has 
t-ended to become more in the nature of a judiciary committee, 
rather than an investigating committee. Under these conditions 
the full vigor ahd force of the utilities commission cannot be 
expended to promote the public interest, which becomes the 
desideratum of public utility regulation.
The Maine Legislature has conferred upon the public utilities 
commission broad powers. But this is not enough. Such a comm­
ission mast be provided with resources sufficient to carry its 
investigations into all phases of public utility activity if 
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